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Preface
This dissertation is primarily a contribution to the literature on the microeco-
nomics of banking which can generally be defined as a broad field of applied mi-
croeconomics focused on the phenomena specific to the banking industry. Although
the banking industry is a very popular object of study among researchers and the
topics of interest with applications to the banking industry span practically the
whole universe of microeconomic theory, the microeconomics of banking as a sepa-
rate field is relatively young and has undergone most of its development only since
the introduction of the asymmetric information paradigm in the 1980’s1.
The focus of the literature evolved from a simple application of general the-
oretical insights to the new original modeling approaches reflecting the unique
characteristics of banks and their role in the market. Specifically, the banking
industry is one of the industries (possibly challenged only by the health care in-
dustry) most exposed to the asymmetric information phenomena and thus most
of the modern approaches to banking work with the assumption of asymmetric
information. The uniqueness of banks is then perceived mainly in their role of
transformation of financial assets (the services of divisibility, term and risk trans-
formation) in which banks have a comparative advantage due to scale and scope
economies, their role of pools of liquidity in providing the insurance against idiosyn-
1Detailed overview of the development of the field can be found in Freixas and Rochet (1997)
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cratic shocks to consumers’ consumption needs and finally their role of facilitators
of effective monitoring of the economic agents’ investment projects (thus they also
provide the implied mitigation of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
inherent to the asymmetric information environment). These specific characteris-
tics make the banking industry both exceptionally attractive and demanding from
the research point of view.
Although many aspects of bank behavior have already been thoroughly studied,
there is still room for interesting theoretical developments which can be achieved
by extending the existing models by realistic assumptions about the economic
instruments that can be used by banks to achieve their ultimate objectives. The
binding theme behind the chapters of this dissertation is that banks are very
complex economic agents which can react to their market situation through a wide
arsenal of different instruments, some of which have not been studied in sufficient
detail so far. The dissertation focuses on some of the yet unexplored features of
these instruments.
All the three theoretical chapters build on some form of strategic interaction
in which one or more banks are involved. It is shown that banks can use different
tools (retail fees, loan interest rates or credit information sharing mechanisms) to
strengthen their position in these interactions and thus improve their profitability.
From the theoretical point of view, all the three theoretical chapters use the tools
of applied game theory, two of them with special focus on asymmetric information
issues.
The first chapter focuses on the interaction between a bank and its potential
borrowers of various quality. Apart from the usual form of asymmetric information
between the bank and its borrowers (i.e. the assumption that the bank cannot
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observe the borrower’s type), there is also an additional informational imperfection
in that the borrowers themselves can have false perceptions about their quality
(i.e. some of the bad borrowers believe they are good). In such a setting, the
choice of the relative size of fees paid by everybody and the interest rates paid
only by the successful borrowers is shown to be an effective way of screening
loan applicants and thus alleviating the inherent adverse selection problem. It
is shown that the higher is the degree of the borrower’s misperceptions about
their skills the higher fees should be expected. In an alternative setup it is shown
that comparable results can be received when banks posses an imperfect testing
technology (this assumption replaces the assumption about the borrower’s false
perceptions). Moreover, both setups also imply that under realistic conditions
increasing wealth inequality in a country leads to higher fees because increasing
fees disqualify relatively fewer borrowers. These theoretical findings are used as a
possible explanation of the observed vast international differences in retail bank
fees between countries on different levels of economic development.
The second chapter is centered around the interaction between competing
banks facing a heterogenous pool of potential borrowers. The setup is similar
to the one from the first chapter but it now includes multiple banks which are
allowed to share information about the potential borrowers. Information sharing
is shown to be an effective device for facilitating tacit collusion between banks and
under some conditions even leads to a natural oligopoly outcome in which there is
a maximum number of banks supporting a stable equilibrium in the market. The
important contribution to the existing literature is that the results hold even under
transactional banking (i.e. without repeated bank-borrower encounters) and also
under the realistic assumption that banks also share the information about loan
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application history instead of just the information about past defaults.
One of the important outcomes of the first chapter is that banks may use tying
of loans to deposits in order to create an effective offering with the desired screening
characteristics. The third chapter focuses on the relationship between the loan
and deposit side on a more general level. The strategic interaction involved in the
chapter is the interaction between a bank and a potential new competitor, i.e. an
interaction inherent to any industry attractive for new entry. It is shown that the
bank’s decisions about loans and deposits are interdependent under very general
conditions, even in an environment without asymmetric information. Evaluations
of policy measures aimed at one of the two sides of the banks’ business should
thus take into account also the implied effects on the other side (e.g. deposit rate
controls which have recently received renewed interest among both academics and
policymakers).
The fourth chapter of the dissertation is empirical and focuses on the analysis of
the determinants of retail bank fees in the Central European region with a special
focus on explaining the international differences in fees. The analysis is based
on the predictions of the existing literature and it uses a unique dataset with
interesting cross-developmental variation on one hand and important similarities
implied by the traditional ties between the countries on the other hand (the dataset
includes Austria as a traditionally strong banking country and the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as the countries which are still in the process of
gradual development of their banking sectors). Due to the characteristics of the
dataset, we are able to use an approach based on a representative client behavior
and thus overcome some of the potential biases inherent to studying individual fees.
Our results support the Structure Conduct Performance hypothesis and confirm
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the hypothesized importance of the degree of reliance on cashless payments and
the differences in labor intensity and technological level of the banks’ operations.
To summarize, the theoretical part of the dissertation provides new insights
about the behavior of banks in important strategic interactions. Specifically, these
insights relate to three of the banks’ fundamental strategic instruments (retail fees,
loan interest rates and credit information sharing) and their use in the interactions.
The empirical part of the dissertation then complements the theoretical part by
providing an analysis of the determinants of the fee levels using a unique dataset.
The results have important policy relevance for the recent debate about the level
of retail bank fees in some of the less developed countries or competition policy
measures aimed at regulating the degree of competition in the banking industry.
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Chapter 1
Alternative explanations of the
international differences in retail
bank fees
(Joint work with Petr Chovanec)
Abstract
In this chapter we discuss alternative explanations of the vast international differ-
ences in bank fees. We are able to show that bank fees are positively related to the
level of loan applicants’ misperception of their skills (‘noise’). We argue that in
countries with a higher level of ‘noise’ banks tend to charge higher fees in order to
defend their bottom lines against the lower implied average quality of borrowers.
We further show that banks tend to charge higher fees when their creditworthiness
testing technology is of a lesser quality. Finally, we also illustrate how the results
about fees depend on the wealth level and wealth inequality in a given country.
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1.1 Introduction
Retail bank fees have always been a very important source of income of banks
around the world1. They represent one of the main pricing instruments at the
banks’ disposal. Traditionally, retail bank fees have been seen in the literature
mainly as the banks’ tools for covering transaction and administrative costs as-
sociated with payment and deposit related services. We argue in this paper that
fees may have other important roles which allow banks to improve their operating
efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information.
It has been noted by several empirical studies that the level of retail bank fees
tends to be very different in different countries, despite the continuing process
of globalization and integration (more about the past and current trends in the
section Observed empirical trends). Interestingly, the pattern of these differences
indicates that fees tend to be higher in less developed countries. In this paper, we
discuss two alternative theoretical explanations of this phenomenon, one based on
the trade-off between creditworthiness testing quality and screening by fees and
the other on the role of fees as a tool for coping with the adverse selection effects
implied by the loan applicants’ misperceptions of their skills.
The research has important policy relevance. A better understanding of the
driving forces of the international differences in fees can help us predict how the
level of bank fees will evolve with the changing economic environment in the tran-
sition and developing countries. Moreover, it can also help the regulatory institu-
1For example, on the level of the whole Czech banking industry, the profit from fees and com-
missions amounted to over 31 billion CZK in 2004 while the interest profit (including securities)
amounted to about 60 billion CZK in the same year (based on the data from Czech National
Bank (2005)).
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tions decide whether the fees are indeed suspiciously high or whether they are in
line with the economic environment in a given country.
The paper is organized in the following way. In the next section, we discuss
a brief classification of different types of bank fees in order to clarify the main
object of our interest in this paper. Next, we discuss the observed empirical
trends related to the structure and the level of fees, emphasizing the observed
negative relationship between the level of fees and the economic development of
a country. We then proceed to the discussion of the traditional explanations of
this observed phenomenon and following that we present the intuition behind our
proposed alternative explanation. Finally, following a brief literature review we
present the model and conclusions.
1.1.1 The classification of fees
Our goal in this section is to specify what exactly is meant by bank fees in the
context of this paper. We do not aspire here to list all the possible types of fees
used by banks around the world. Neither would it be feasible due to the immense
variety of banks’ pricing models, nor would it be useful for our research purposes.
Instead, we borrow a classification presented in a study by Capgemini, EFMA and
ING (2005) and discuss the scope of the paper within this classification.
Generally, the main categories of bank products are core day-to-day services
(account management, payments, cash utilization and exceptions handling), sav-
ings products (certificates of deposit, mutual funds etc.), credit products (over-
drafts, consumer credit, mortgages, loans etc.) and additional products such as
insurance, real estate or concierge services. Although fees can be charged for
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products falling into basically any of these categories, most attention of both mass
media and policymakers has been paid to the fees on the core day-to-day services.
The product categories listed above are by no means independent and banks
can use their pricing strategies to leverage the linkages between these product
categories. For example, some of the products from the credit products category
can be strategically tied to the core day-to-day product category. Banks can also
cross-sell products from two or more categories, effectively subsidizing one category
and compensating for that by high profits in another category.
The model we present in this paper has general implications for fees associated
with all the product categories listed above. However, for the ease of exposition,
it is cast in the form of a bank-borrower interaction, thus a natural interpreta-
tion seems to be that the fees used in the model are either the loan application
and processing fees or the account management fees under tying of loans to ac-
counts (i.e. they represent the fees from the credit products or core day-to-day
services category; more about the validity of these settings below). We discuss the
applicability of the model to the other types of fees below.
1.1.2 Observed empirical trends
In this section we focus mainly on the fees for the core day-to-day services as they
have traditionally received most attention. Two interesting phenomena have been
repeatedly addressed by the policymakers and other interested parties - firstly, the
apparent vast differences in bank fees between banks from different countries (even
within the EU single market area)2, and secondly, the differences in the structure
2For an illustration of the international differences in retail bank fees see Figure 1.7 in the
Appendix.
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of the fee schemes prevalent within individual countries or regions.
According to a number of industry studies, banks’ pricing models are very het-
erogeneous when fees are concerned. For example, the Capgemini, EFMA and
ING (2005) study has identified four distinctive types of approaches to pricing of
the products from the core day-to-day services category. These are the account
based, packaged based, transaction based and indirect revenue based pricing ap-
proaches. Banks using the account based approach set a range of fees including
fees for account management and usually tie products from other categories to the
account. Banks pricing according to the packaged based approach charge a fixed
fee for a whole package of various products. The transaction based approach is
characterized by a range of fees for virtually any bank product whereas the indirect
revenue approach is based on low or non-existing fees but high interest spreads or
high fees for services from other categories of bank products. Interestingly, all the
four pricing approaches have been found to coexist in the market.
The described heterogeneity of pricing approaches indicates the significant com-
plexity of the banks’ pricing problems. This complexity may arguably be implied
by the vast product portfolios of modern retail banks as well as by the desire of
banks to use fees strategically to influence the behavior of clients or competitor
banks. This point and the complexity of the pricing problem in general can be
illustrated on the historical development of pricing behavior used by banks in the
Czech Republic since the second half of the 1990’s. We choose the Czech example
because the rapid evolution of the banking sector in the transition economy gave
us the opportunity to observe interesting dynamics over a relatively short period
of time.
The Czech banks’ approaches to pricing core day-to-day services evolved in
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several stages. In the first stage, banks rapidly increased fees for over-the-counter
services at the end of the nineties, motivating people to open current accounts
and start using ATMs. In the second stage, starting around the year 2001, banks
proceeded by significantly increasing the fees for using ATMs in the drive to further
decrease the level of their clients’ reliance on cash payments and increase profits
from their already locked-in clients. The third stage began around 2003 when
the fees for core day-to-day services received increased attention of the general
public. The topic of the ensuing debate was the banks’ prevailing practice of
charging fees for closing a current account as well as the continually rising level
of other fees. The debate culminated at the end of 2005 when a major consumer
defense organization initiated litigation against one of the major banks on the
Czech market and later extended the scope of the litigation against yet another
bank. One of the main results of the debate was the elimination of the fee for
closing of an account and the adoption of a self-regulation mechanism by the
major Czech banking institutions with the stated aim of eliminating the switching
costs and achieving greater transparency of the banks’ offerings. Although the
most recent development could possibly be characterized by a surge in the use
of the package based approach to pricing, the trend seems to be less profound
compared to the past and thus the heterogeneity in pricing styles across banks is
becoming increasingly apparent.
The high degree of heterogeneity in pricing approaches makes comparisons of
individual levels of fees very difficult if not misleading. Different banks using
different pricing approaches may use one specific type of fees in a totally different
way as they optimize prices for the whole portfolio of products. However, it is
possible to compare the total expenditure a client has to make for a specified
14
bundle of services over a given period of time. Specifically, it is possible to specify
the behavior of a typical client and calculate an index of prices of the services
regularly consumed by this client. This approach has been taken by a number
of industry studies including the Capgemini, EFMA and ING (2005) study, the
results of which we use as the basis for the following discussion.
Specifically, the authors of the study have found a striking result. They have
created a fee index based on a localized behavior pattern3 in a set of both developed
and emerging economies, normalized the fee index by the GDP per capita in a given
country4 and found that the resulting variable tends to be relatively lower in the
less developed countries. Thus, they have found empirical evidence for a negative
relationship between the level of the fees for the core day-to-day services and the
economic performance of a given country. We focus in this paper on the alternative
theoretical explanations of this puzzling empirical phenomenon.
1.1.3 Traditional explanations of the fee differentials
The goal of this section is to discuss the traditional explanations of the interna-
tional fee differentials pointed out in the previous section. The list of the explana-
tions discussed here is by no means meant to be exhaustive. We focus on the most
common explanations which emerged in the media or during the debates among
banks, policymakers and other interested parties.
The simplest explanation of the apparent vast differences in the level of retail
bank fees between countries is that the GDP per capita is lower in the less devel-
3The authors of the study have defined the typical bank client behavior in a given country
based on the data collected from individual banks in the country.
4This is by no means the only possible normalization but it can be expected to approxi-
mate the real burden that fee-related activities represent in the different countries within a very
heterogeneous sample.
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oped countries and thus the denominator of the ratio of fees to GDP per capita (a
measure often used in international comparisons) is lower for these countries. The
implicit assumption behind this argument is that there is what could be called a
free movement of retail bank capital between countries and thus the nominal fees
must be the same in all countries or else there would exist profitable arbitrage op-
portunities. However, according to a number of studies5, the national retail bank
markets still seem to be rather separated with little across-the-border activity.
A More reasonable explanation, often put forward by bankers themselves, is
based on the assumed international differences in demand characteristics6. The ar-
gument runs as follows. Apart from the core day-to-day services like bank account
management, banks also offer their clients more complex services which are usually
tied to the basic ones (e.g. various types of saving, credit or insurance products).
Depending on the demand characteristics, the basic services may be used as a
loss leader in order to capture more clients who will then generate high profits by
paying higher margins on the additional services purchased from the bank. The
implicit assumption behind this story is that banks are somehow able to cash in on
the higher complexity of the additional services by securing higher margins than
they can on the basic ones. We believe one possible reason why this may happen is
higher differentiation potential of the additional services. The higher complexity
of these services allows banks to differentiate themselves from competition on more
dimensions than they can with the basic commodity-like services.
5See for example the European Commission Interim Report II: Current Accounts and Related
Services.
6For an interesting discussion about retail bank fees see for example the interview
of the CNB Vice-Governor Luděk Niedermayer for the Czech Radio from the 14-th
September 2005 (the transcript of the interview is available on the CNB webpages at
http://www.cnb.cz/cs/verejnost/pro media/clanky rozhovory/media 2005/cl 05 050914.html).
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The other two prominent factors believed to be affecting the level of bank
fees are banks’ costs and the degree of competition in the banking market. If
banks in the less developed countries are less cost effective or face higher costs
than their western counterparts then one would expect the fee differentials to
reflect this gap. One might hypothesize that one of the major drivers of the
high levels of fees in the less developed countries is the relatively higher use of
cash payments in these countries. The higher the cash-dependence of a country
the higher are the costs of providing the basic services - banks need much many
people to handle the cash, count it, etc. Moreover, it is much more difficult
to transform this cash into lending; banks are thus less inclined to lend (could be
understood as the opportunity cost of cash). The hypothesis that cash-dependence
of a country strongly determines the costs of providing basic services seems to
conform very well with the observed inverse relationship between the normalized
fee levels and the economic development of a country - less developed countries
are usually much more cash-dependent than modern developed economies in which
widespread use of electronic payments has mostly limited cash payments only to
very small transactions or illegal business activities. However, this hypothesis of
the effect of cash-dependence has not been tested yet.
The differences in fees are often believed to result from the lower degree of
competition in the banking industry in the less developed countries. However,
the predictions of the theoretical literature on the effect of competition on pricing
behavior in banking are mixed and there are papers suggesting that prices set
by banks may be increasing in the number of banks in the industry7. Thus, the
7As reviewed by Brewer and Jackson (2006) or Shaffer (2004), there are two main competing
theories - the traditional Market power theory, usually understood in the form of the Structure-
Conduct-Performance hypothesis (SCP hypothesis) due to Mason (1939) and Bain (1951, 1956),
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direction of the competition effect is generally unclear.
1.1.4 Our approach
The goal of this paper is not to reject the validity of the traditional explanations
listed above. Instead, we add alternative explanations which are based on specific
factors influencing the banking industry and which can enrich the debate about
the development of fees in different countries.
The results of our models are based on the following simple intuition. Fees can
be shown to play the role of a sorting device in the lending relationship between
borrowers and banks, just as collateral does (see e.g. Besanko and Thakor (1987)).
The idea is that fees are paid upfront, at the beginning of the lending contract and
the loan rates are paid ex-post, only after the borrower survives till the end of the
contract. This of course assumes that everybody applying for a loan is required to
pay a fee, e.g. by having an open account with the bank8. Limited liability (either
legal or effective) implies that borrowers with lower probability of success prefer
to pay higher rates contingent on success rather than uncontingent upfront fees.
The banks’ temptation to charge as high fees as possible is limited by the
borrowers’ wealth constraints. If banks are able to offer a set of different contracts,
self selection assures that bad borrowers choose contracts with low fees and high
rates. If the bad borrowers are so bad that they are ex-ante unprofitable for banks
and the Efficient Structure hypothesis (ES hypothesis) developed by Demsetz (1973) and Peltz-
man (1977). Higher concentration leads to higher prices under the SCP hypothesis (e.g. due to
scale economies or the X-inefficiencies discussed by Liebenstein (1966)) but may lead to lower
prices under the ES hypothesis (the more efficient firms are assumed to gain market share in the
dynamics of competition). Thus, the two main strands of literature in this area lead to opposite
implications.
8Strong empirical evidence for tying of bank accounts to loans or mortgages has been docu-
mented by the European Commission’s recent Interim Report II: Current Accounts and Related
Services.
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then banks choose fees and rates to maximize profits from the good borrowers
given the condition that the bad borrowers are discouraged from applying for a
loan. In such a setting there is not much room for interesting comparative statics
as the level of fees is determined only by the relative characteristics of the good
and bad borrowers and by the maximum willingness to pay of the good ones. The
setup and implications described above are actually similar in many respects to
the models used in the literature on collateral and bank loan commitments (see
the review below).
However, interesting insights can be inferred once we extend the basic setup.
If some borrowers with low success probability are overconfident and believe they
are better than they actually are and some borrowers with high success probability
are underestimating themselves then fees may depend on the degree of this mis-
perception of borrowers (henceforth we will call it noise). The higher are the fees
the fewer borrowers can afford to pay them but the higher are the expected returns
from the bad borrowers. Up to a certain level, the more bad borrowers mix up
with the good ones thinking they are good, the higher fees will be charged because
the lost profits from the good borrowers who cannot afford to pay the higher fees
is offset by the higher returns from the bad borrowers in the pool. Thus, according
to this intuition, fees should be higher in countries with higher level of noise in the
economy. Empirical evidence for the international differences in the level of over-
confidence can be found in Koellinger, Minniti and Schade (2007). These authors
show that entrepreneurial overconfidence is very different in different countries.
Other interesting insights follow when we introduce testing into the original
specification - this can in fact be seen as an application of the Guasch and Weiss
(1981) model of testing with application fees on the labor market. Once we allow
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banks to use imperfect testing of borrowers we get a tradeoff between testing and
screening by fees. Banks sort ex-ante indistinguishable applicants into different
groups according to the results of the test. With just two types of borrowers, there
is a group which passed and the other which did not. The better is the test the
higher is the share of good borrowers in the first group. Thus, better testing in this
setup is essentially the same as lower noise in the previous setup. Ceteris paribus,
fees should be higher in countries with worse available testing technologies. This
conforms well with the observed inverse relationship between the normalized fee
levels and the economic development of a country because banks in less developed
countries arguably have worse testing capabilities as the parameters in their testing
and scoring models are derived from relatively smaller samples due to the lack of
credit history.
Before advancing to the literature review and then finally to the model itself,
we first comment on the generality of our approach. The fees play two important
roles in our model. First, we model the role of fees as a type of collateral which
can be used as a screening device to affect the composition (and thus also the
average quality) of the pool of clients faced by a bank9. Second, we model fees as
an upfront uncontingent income which can be used to affect the bank’s expected
income for a given composition of its pool of clients. The collateral logic motivated
us to use the lending-borrowing relationship as a platform for the exposition of
our main ideas. Thus the fee in our model can be best interpreted as a fee for
processing the loan application and managing the loan account or as the present
9As pointed out by one of the referees, Martin Čihák, the similarity with collateral is obviously
not perfect as there are important differences between the two instruments (e.g. fees are generally
not returned to the borrower). However, the screening role played by fees in our model is similar
to that played by collateral in the literature.
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value of the fees for the current account management to which the loan application
is tied by the client’s bank. However, the model’s implications are more general
and can be applied to other types of fees as well. The idea is that from the bank’s
point of view there are often some good and bad clients who are affected differently
by a given level of fees charged by the bank. For example, the same logic applies
to the problem of a bank faced by two types of depositors who both may demand
some additional services in the future but differ in their probability of actually
demanding them. In this case, an upfront fee for the depositors’ current account
plays the role of the fee in our model, the fee for the additional services plays
the role of the loan interest rate in our model, the probability of demanding the
additional services (and thus paying the fee for these services) plays the role of
the quality of borrowers in our model and the bank’s experience with assessing the
type of depositor plays the role of the testing technology in our model.
1.2 Theoretical Literature Review
Although the literature aimed specifically at the determination of retail bank fees
is very small, there are other important strands of literature relevant for our topic.
The fees can obviously be affected by standard factors such as costs and the degree
of barriers to competition. Thus, all the standard Industrial Organization models
of price determination are potentially relevant for studying the determination of
fees. However, we believe the international differences in bank fees can also be
codetermined by more subtle demand driven factors affecting the whole service
portfolio of the bank, not only the fee related services. Thus, we believe it is
important to consider also the possible linkages between the different types of
21
bank services. In this section we briefly review the most relevant contributions
from the literature on collateral and bank loan commitments as the research areas
closest to our approach.
The fees can under some assumptions be interpreted as a type of collateral
(under risk neutrality and tying of loans to fee related services, the fee can be
understood as the present value of the collateral) and thus the literature on the
screening role of collateral is very relevant for us10. The seminal papers on the
informational role of collateral are Bester (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987).
The models derived from these contributions imply that collateral is an effective
tool for alleviating the adverse selection problems by screening in the environment
of asymmetric information between banks and borrowers. Thanks to the availabil-
ity of collateral, banks are able to distinguish between otherwise indistinguishable
borrowers because the riskier borrowers prefer the contracts with lower collateral
and higher loan rates, whereas the less risky borrowers choose the contracts with
higher collateral requirements but lower rates. This implies a negative relationship
between risk and the level of collateral requirements. As this is not in line with
the majority of the existing empirical evidence, huge effort has been made to find
reasons for the opposite relationship. Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991) show that
the relationship can be positive when banks are also faced by moral hazard and
Coco (1999) shows that a positive relationship occurs when heterogeneous atti-
tudes to risk are introduced into the model. However, in all these models the level
of collateral depends only on the relative riskiness of the borrowers and none of
these models involves testing as an alternative to screening by collateral.
10This close relationship between fees and collateral implies that the results of our models can
actually be reinterpreted in terms of the the effects of entrepreneurial overconfidnce or testing
quality on collateral requirements
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The combination of collateral and testing is modeled in Manove et al. (2001)
who show that creditor protection in the form of low restrictions on collateral re-
quirements can lead to socially inefficient equilibria in which too many bad projects
are financed due to insufficient testing of loan applicants by banks. Testing in their
model is costly and banks are thus not motivated to test the loan applicants when
high quality applicants post enough collateral. The implication of the model is
that restrictions on the use of collateral can lead to a socially more efficient equi-
libria in which banks use more testing. Although Manove et al. combine screening
by collateral and testing, they use the assumption of perfect testing technology,
don’t account for any wealth constraints among loan applicants and also use sim-
pler assumptions about information imperfections. Thus, the model’s parameters
cannot be easily identified with country specific factors needed for explaining the
international differences in bank fees.
Another strand of literature close to our topic is the literature on bank loan
commitments. Kanatas (1987) shows that bank loan commitments can be used to
signal the firms’ quality on the capital market. Similarly to the case of collateral,
higher quality firms are willing to pay a higher commitment fee and a lower in-
terest rate because they are more likely to exercise the commitment. Thus, even
risk neutral firms can signal to other institutions on the capital market (e.g. in-
vestors on the commercial paper market) its quality by purchasing the bank loan
commitment. Similarly, Thakor and Udell (1987) show that a combination of a
commitment fee and a service fee can be used as an effective tool for identifying
the borrowers’ probabilities of the loan takedown, i.e. they can serve as a screen-
ing device in the loan commitment contract (the borrowers with higher takedown
probability choose a combination with higher commitment fee compensated by a
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lower service fee because they have higher probability of actually paying the ser-
vice fee). However, as in the case of the models with collateral, the fee level is
again determined by the objective risk characteristics of borrowers and there is no
testing as an alternative to screening.
Outside the literature on collateral and commitment fees, another interesting
model with bank fees playing the role of a screening device is Loranth (2000).
The model uses a specific industry structure with many incumbent banks and one
entrant. The incumbents offer only credit services whereas the entrant offers a
package of credit and financial services. The financial services are assumed to
increase the return from the projects and the fee required for these services is
paid upfront (thus is not dependent on the borrower’s type). As a result of the
screening, the better borrowers (with higher probability of successful completion
of their projects) are served by the entrant. The same result is shown to hold also
for an alternative industry structure - a vertically differentiated duopoly. However,
similarly as in the cases above, screening is based on the relative risk characteristics
of borrowers, there is no testing technology in the model and the assumed industry
structure is very specific.
Our models are similar to the ones above in the role of screening played by
fees. However, in the first part of the paper, we add a new degree of uncertainty to
our model in the form of the borrowers’ misperception about their abilities and in
the second part of the paper, we enrich the standard setup by introducing testing
as an alternative to screening by fees. We show that these modifications lead to




1.3.1 Imperfect knowledge about borrowers’ skills
Let’s assume there is a mass M of risk neutral borrowers of two types - good and
bad, in proportions l and 1 − l, respectively. Both types have an opportunity to
engage in a project11 which requires the investment of 1 unit of money and has
the return of X units in the case of success and 0 units otherwise (we assume the
project is not ex-ante unprofitable, i.e. X > 1). The probabilities of success are
p1 for the good borrowers and p2 for the bad borrowers, with p1 > p2.
Information is imperfect and asymmetric - some of the bad borrowers believe
they are of the good type. Let the fraction of borrowers who believe they are good
be equal to m (i.e. the total number of this group of borrowers is mM) and let q1
be the fraction of good borrowers among those who believe they are good. We call
this specific form of information imperfection noise. For simplicity of exposition,
we now normalize the mass of borrowers believing to be good to 1 (i.e. mM = 1).
There is some initial wealth distribution which is independent on the type
of borrowers but no borrower has sufficient wealth for investing into the project
without borrowing additional funds (i.e. no borrower has wealth 1 or more units
of money)12.
11For the sake of expositional simplicity, we choose to present the model in terms of borrowers
having projects. However, in the context of retail bank fees, we can also think of the borrower
types in terms of their job stability (we thank one of the referees, Evan Kraft, for this point).
Specifically, the good borrowers could be those who have stable jobs and thus are more likely to
honor their loan commitments whereas the bad ones are more likely to lose their jobs and thus
are also less likely to honor their loan commitments.
12Alternatively, it can be assumed that all borrowers have the same amount of initial endow-
ment of money but there is a distribution of the willingness of borrowers to use these funds for
investing into the project.
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Banks cannot see the type of the borrower but they know the parameter q1
13.
They are also not able to verify the initial wealth endowments of borrowers but
they can verify the borrower’s success in the project. They can offer loan contracts
specified by the loan rate and the fee they charge for it. It is assumed that banks
always lend the full amount needed for the project, i.e. all loans are of constant
size equal to 1. We assume that the borrowers who believe themselves to be bad
are ex ante unprofitable for the bank. We also denote A = q1p1 +(1−q1)p2. When
the level of noise increases, q1 decreases and so does A.
Generally, the bank’s optimization problem is to find the profit maximizing
combination of fee and interest rate. Different borrowers react to different com-
binations of these prices differently according to what type (good or bad) they
believe themselves to be. Thus, banks can engage in screening and influence the
composition of the pool of borrowers attracted by the offered contract. The two
alternative bank’s strategies are to offer a contract that attracts only the borrowers
who believe themselves to be good or another contract that attracts both types of
borrowers (we assume the latter group of borrowers is ex-ante unprofitable for the
bank and thus there is no individual profitable contract for this group). The bank
should calculate the profit from both these alternatives and then choose the one
which leads to higher profit, i.e. the bank should decide whether it is optimal to
use screening or not. We focus on the screening alternative here because it leads
to interesting results about the influence of noise on the level of fees but we discuss
the conditions under which this alternative is actually optimal later in the end of
13As banks know the parameter q1 and the borrowers do not, the banks have informational
advantage over the borrowers. However, compared to the informational advantage in Bond,
Musto and Yilmaz (2006), the advantage is only partial and banks still cannot see the exact type
of the borrower. Bond et al. (2006) assume the bank knows exactly whether a given borrower is
good or bad and thus it can engage in predatory lending which is not possible in our model.
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this section.
Under the screening alternative, the bank has the following ‘per capita’ profit
function:
πpc = A(1 + r) + C − 1 (1.1)
where r and C are the bank’s choice variables, r being the loan interest rate and
C the fee at the beginning of the loan contract. Fraction A of the population
succeeds and repays the loan including the interest and everybody pays the fee C.
The initial wealth distribution and the presence of upfront fees imply that fewer
and fewer borrowers are able to participate as the fee increases. We assume the
wealth distribution implies a function D(C) satisfying D(0) = 1, D(1) = 0, D′ ≤ 0
on (0, 1). This function returns the fraction of borrowers who can afford to pay
the given fee (no decision problem of borrowers is thus involved, a given contract
C and r may be attractive but not feasible for some borrowers due to their limited
wealth)14.
Therefore, the total profit maximization problem of the bank takes the following
form
max π = max
C,r
[A(1 + r) + C − 1)]D(C) (1.2)
p2[X − (1 + r)] < C (1.3)
p1[X − (1 + r)] ≥ C (1.4)
Condition 1.3 is a sufficient condition for making the contract unattractive to
the borrowers who believe themselves to be bad and condition 1.4 is the partici-
pation constraint of the borrowers who believe themselves to be good.
14For an illustration of the derivation of the function D(C) see the Appendix.
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Later we argue that under monopoly condition 1.4 is binding. Thus, we can
solve this problem in the standard way as a constrained optimization problem with
two variables. However, for discussions about alternative setups of the model and
for the ease of comparative statics, we choose a different solution approach based
on the following important insight (although this approach may first seem to be
unnecessarily cumbersome).
Since all applying borrowers believe themselves to be good (we assume banks
choose such combinations of fees and rates that only those who believe themselves
to be good are interested in applying), they perceive the contract (C, r) as being
equivalent to a hypothetical contract (0, rr) defined by
E(C + 1successr) = E1successrr (1.5)
which under risk neutrality of borrowers translates to
p1rr = C + p1r (1.6)
This follows from the fact that borrowers borrow a dollar, pay C upfront and
pay r as the interest payment in the event of success; therefore, they believe they
will pay C + p1r in expectation. But this means that from the viewpoint of the
borrowers there exists a unique rr (henceforth called effective interest rate) such
that C + p1r = rr. Of course, we must assume that C is above the minimal rate
required to discourage bad borrowers (this requirement will be discussed below).
Using the effective interest rate rr, the bank’s optimization problem can be
solved in two steps. In the first step the bank chooses the optimal mixture of r
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and C for a given effective interest rate rr. In the second step it maximizes profit
by selecting the optimal rr.
The first step representation of the problem takes the following form
π(r, C) = max
C,r
[A(1 + r) + C − 1)]D(C) (1.7)
p1rr = C + p1r (1.8)
p2[X − (1 + r)] < C (1.9)
p1[X − (1 + r)] ≥ C (1.10)
Lemma 1.1 dr
dA
is positive for given rr if 2(A − p1)D′(p1rr − p1r) − (A(1 + r) +
p1rr − p1r − 1)D′′(p1rr − p1r)p1 < 0, which holds if D is concave or at least not
‘too’ convex - to be specified.
Proof 1.1 See the Appendix.
The bank maximizes its profit for a given rr which means that the level of fee
C can be calculated from the equation defining the effective interest rate p1rr =




The required characteristics of the function D(C) are realistic because they are
implied by reasonable assumptions about the wealth distribution in the population.





f(W )dW = 1− F (C)
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If we assume that the population wealth distribution has the form of a Gaussian
curve, we can expect the graph of the D(C) function to be concave in the beginning
as increasing fees disqualify only small numbers of the poorest borrowers and
convex for high levels of fees as only the highest tail of the wealth distribution
remains in the game.
If we assume that the population wealth distribution has the form of a Pareto
distribution (as is usually assumed), we get a positive relationship between the
level of noise and the level of fees for realistic values of parameters, although
the implied D(C) function is convex in that case. Moreover, using the Pareto
distribution we can also study the impact of changing income inequality on the
level of fees. It turns out that for realistic values of parameters increasing inequality
leads to increasing fees. This has an intuitive explanation because a given level of
fees disqualifies relatively fewer potential borrowers under higher inequality.
We receive analogous results also when we use the Log-normal distribution.
In this case, it is also easy to study the relationship between the fee level and
the average initial wealth in a given country. It turns out that for realistic values
of the parameters increasing average initial wealth leads to increasing fees but
decreasing share of fees on the average initial wealth. Thus, our model is in line
with the observed empirical trends discussed above.
Detailed illustration of the relationship between the level of fees and the values
of the main parameters under both the Pareto distribution and the Log-normal
distribution is given in the Appendix.
Now, it remains to solve the second step problem, i.e. the optimization with
respect to the effective interest rate rr. This turns out to be easier than one might
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expect because it is easy to show15 that the bank’s profit is increasing in rr and
thus the bank will choose the highest possible rr. Under monopoly, the highest
possible rr coincides with the maximum willingness to pay of the borrowers who
believe they are good. Formally, the effective interest rate chosen by the bank
satisfies the good borrowers’ participation constraint with equality, i.e.
p1(X − (1 + r)) = C (1.11)
which under the assumed risk-neutrality of borrowers translates to
rr = X (1.12)
Note that the maximum willingness to pay of the borrowers who believe themselves
to be good is independent of A. The important implication for us is that the optimal
level of the effective interest rate is also independent on the level of A and thus
our conclusion about dC
dA
< 0 remains valid.
We have discussed the first of the bank’s strategies - the screening option.
The alternative strategy is to offer such a contract which attracts both types
of borrowers (differentiated by their beliefs about their own type). The pooling
contract does not have to violate the participation constraint of the borrowers who
believe themselves to be bad and thus the level of the fee can be set to a lower
level than in the screening contract. A lower fee in turn means potentially more
applying good borrowers, who would not otherwise be able to apply due to their
low initial wealth.
15For the proof of the positive relationship between bank’s profit and rr see the Appendix.
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The optimization problem under the pooling strategy looks as follows
π(r, C) = max
C,r
([lp1 + (1− l)p2](1 + r) + C − 1)D(C)M (1.13)
p2[X − (1 + r)] ≥ C (1.14)
The participation constraint of the good borrowers is redundant in this case
because it is implied by the participation constraint of the bad borrowers. Under
monopoly, the bank fully exercises its market power and thus sets such a combina-
tion of C and r that the participation constraint of the bad borrowers is satisfied
with equality. Thus, the optimization problem becomes easily solvable allowing
the bank to compare the resulting profitability with that of the screening contract
in order to choose the best strategy. The level of the fee in the pooling contract
obviously does not depend on the level of noise because the proportion q1 does not
even enter the profit function under the pooling strategy.
The relative profitability of the two strategies depends on the level of the
following parameters. First, the higher is the fraction of the borrowers believing
to be good (the parameter m), the more attractive is the pooling contract. This
is because higher m means relatively lower number of the borrowers in the second
group which implies relatively less important worsening of the quality of borrowers
faced by the bank. Second, the lower is the difference between the objective
qualities of the good and bad borrowers p1 and p2, the greater restrictions imposes
the participation constraint of the bad borrowers on the minimal level of the fee C
and thus the less attractive is the screening strategy. Third, the lower is the fraction
of the good borrowers among those believing to be bad, the more important is the
worsening of the pool of borrowers faced by the bank under the pooling strategy
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and thus the more attractive is the screening strategy.
1.3.2 Testing of borrowers
Next, we modify the setup of the model by introducing testing of borrowers. Banks
are now assumed to possess a simple technology which allows them to sort the loan
candidates into two categories. The first category consists of those candidates who
passed the test and are identified as high quality borrowers and the second consists
of the test failures identified as unworthy of receiving a bank loan. The testing
technology is imperfect with the following commonly known characteristics: t1 is
the probability of a good borrower being identified by the test as a high quality
candidate, t2 is the probability of a bad borrower being identified as a high quality
candidate, i.e. 1− t1 is a type 1 error, t2 is a type 2 error.
For simplicity, we now assume there is no noise in the economy, i.e. all borrow-
ers know their type with certainty. We also assume the fraction of good borrowers
in the total population is equal to l, i.e. 1 − l are the bad borrowers. The total
population is now normalized to 1 (i.e. M = 1 and m = 1). Otherwise, we keep
the setup from the previous section.
We maintain the assumption that the bad borrowers are ex-ante unprofitable
for the bank, i.e. p2X < 1. This implies that the bank is still interested in
attracting only the good borrowers and thus it is still targeting the effective interest
rate defined as p1rr = C + p1r. However, in this case, it may be profitable for the
bank to offer a contract which is attractive even for the bad borrowers because high
quality testing can function as a sufficient barrier against significant deterioration
of the bank’s profits due to large numbers of bad borrowers.
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The bank’s (first step) optimization problem thus changes to
π(rr) = max
C,r
[(lt1p1 + (1− l)t2p2)(1 + r) + C − 1)]D(C) (1.15)
p1rr = C + p1r (1.16)
p2[X − (1 + r)] ≥ C (1.17)
When we denote B = (lt1p1 +(1− l)t2p2) we can see the maximization problem
simplifies to a problem which can be solved in the same way as the problem from
the previous section. Following the same logic as above, Lemma 1.1 implies that
dC
dB
< 0. We can thus conclude that better testing leads to lower fees in equilibrium.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the debate about the possible explanations of the vast
international differences in retail bank fees. Specifically, we discussed two alterna-
tive model specifications which imply the observed negative relationship between
the level of retail bank fees and the economic development of a country.
In both specifications, fees play the role of a self-selection device used by banks
to alleviate the negative effects of asymmetric information in their relationship
with potential clients (borrowers). The level of fees is given by balancing the
trade-off between the average expected income per borrower and the size of the
pool of borrowers faced by the bank. The lower is the average quality of borrowers
the higher is the bank’s motivation to charge higher fees to increase the per-
borrower expected income, even at the cost of decreasing the total size of the pool
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of borrowers attracted by the bank.
In the first specification, the average quality of the pool of borrowers is deter-
mined by the the degree of the borrowers’ misperception of their abilities (noise).
The higher is the degree of noise in the economy the higher fees we should expect.
In the second specification, the assumption about noise is replaced by the assump-
tion that banks use imperfect testing to assess the borrowers’ types. The role of
noise is then played by the quality of testing. It has been shown that lower quality
testing implies higher fees in equilibrium.
We also provide a numerical illustration of our results using realistic values of
the main parameters. The illustration supports the validity of our results about
the positive influence of noise and negative influence of the testing quality on the
fee level. Moreover, it also shows an interesting relationship between the fee level
and both the income level and income inequality in a country. Firstly, under the
parameters specified in the Appendix, the fee level is positively related to the
inequality in the initial wealth distribution. Intuitively, under higher inequality
the bank discourages relatively fewer potential borrowers with the same fee level.
Secondly, although the influence of the average initial wealth level on the fee level
is positive, the influence on the fee level as a share of the average initial wealth is
negative. Thus, our results comply with the observed empirical phenomena.
Our results have important policy implications. According to our model, the
level of bank fees in the transition and developing countries will evolve with the
changing economic environment in these countries. To the extent that young
emerging economies can be characterized by relatively higher degrees of noise,
lower quality testing and often also higher income inequality, we can expect the
levels of fees to decrease in time. Importantly, our model implies that higher
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1.5.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
The bank’s profit maximization problem defined in the text takes the form
π(r, C) = max
C,r
[A(1 + r) + C − 1)]D(C) (1.18)
p1rr = C + p1r (1.19)
p2[X − (1 + r)] < C (1.20)
p1[X − (1 + r)] ≥ C (1.21)
Substituting C = p1rr − p1r leads to
π(rr) = max
r
(A(1 + r) + (p1rr − p1r)− 1)D(p1rr − p1r) (1.22)
p2[X − (1 + r)] < C (1.23)
p1[X − (1 + r)] ≥ C (1.24)











((A(1 + r) + (p1rr − p1r)− 1)D(p1rr − p1r)) = (1.26)
(A− p1)D(p1rr − p1r) + (A(1 + r) + (p1rr − p1r)− 1)D′(p1rr − p1r)(−p1) = 0
Now we need to use the Implicit function theorem to show the sign of dA
dr
.
We first have to check the conditions for the applicability of the theorem. Thus,
we have to show that F = 0 and F ′ <> 0. First, F = d
dr
π(rr) = 0 follows
from the definition of the FOC, so the first condition is fulfilled. For the second
condition, we assume that we work with a function fulfilling this inequality on a
given ε−neighborhood of the optimal solution.
d
dA
(A− p1)D(p1rr − p1r) + (A(1 + r) + (p1rr − p1r)− 1)D′(p1rr − p1r)(−p1) <> 0
(1.27)
Applying the Implicit function theorem (assuming D is not dependent on A)
dr
dA
= − D(p1rr − p1r) + (1 + r)D
′(p1rr − p1r)(−p1)
2(A− p1)D′(p1rr − p1r)(−p1) + (A(1 + r) + p1rr − p1r − 1)D′′(p1rr − p1r)p21
(1.28)
Now, we decompose the formula to evaluate the sign of dr
dA
. We know that
D(p1rr − p1r) > 0 because D takes values between 0 and 1 and (1 + r)D′(p1rr −
p1r)(−p1) ≥ 0 because D is a decreasing function from definition. Thus the
nominator is positive.
Concerning the denominator, we know that the following always holds
(A− p1) = q1p1 + q2p2 − p1 < 0 (1.29)
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because p1 > p2 and q1, q2 < 1. Thus, the first part of the summation in the
denominator is always negative. Concerning the second part of the denominator,
we know that
(A(1 + r) + p1rr − p1r − 1) ≥ 0 (1.30)
as this is the per capita profit of the bank. The sign of D′′(C) naturally depends on
the shape of the D(C) function. We receive the result dr
dA
> 0 if D(C) is concave,
linear or even if it is convex, but not ‘too convex’, so that the denominator is still
negative.
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1.5.2 Proof of the positive relationship between bank’s
profit and rr
We want to prove that π(rr) defined by the following equation is increasing in rr.
π(rr) = max
C,r
[A(1 + r) + C − 1)]D(C) (1.31)
p1rr = C + p1r (1.32)
p2[X − (1 + r)] < C (1.33)
We take rr1 and rr2 where rr2 > rr1, and compare values of π. Let (C
∗, r∗) be
the optimal solution for π(rr1), so optimal value is [A(1+r
∗)+C∗−1)]D(C∗). We
can also use (C∗, r∗+(rr2− rr1)) as a feasible solution for π(rr2). But the profit in
this case is π(rr1) + A(rr2 − rr1)D(C∗) which is clearly greater than π(rr1). That
is what we wanted to show16.
16the condition 1.33 is satisfied for rr2 whenever it is satisfied for rr1.
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1.5.3 Illustration of the results under specified distribu-
tions of the borrowers’ initial wealth
In this section of the Appendix, we provide a numerical illustration of the rela-
tionship between the fee level implied by our model and the value of the main
parameters. Specifically, we focus on the effects of noise (or testing quality), the
degree of the borrowers’ initial wealth inequality and the average level of the bor-
rowers’ initial wealth. We provide illustrations for both the cases with the Pareto
distribution and the Log-normal distribution of the borrowers’ initial wealth.
In order to receive numerical results, we first need to specify the explicit formula
for the fee level as a function of the parameters. We use the following first order
condition implied by the optimization problem of the bank.
D(C)(A− p1)− p1(A(X − C
p1
) + C − 1)D′(C) = 0 (1.34)
The solution for C clearly depends on the specific form of the D(C) function.
Pareto distribution
The cumulative distribution function of the Pareto distribution is defined to be
F (x) = 1− (xm
x
)k, xm > 0, k > 0, (1.35)
where xm is the minimum value of x and k is a shape parameter. In order to
suit our setup, we shift the distribution to the left by 1 and choose xm = 0 (in
order to be able to keep the minimum wealth level at 0). The implied form of the





)k, k > 0 (1.36)
The parameter k is linked to the degree of wealth inequality through the fol-
lowing relationship to the Gini coefficient
G =
1
2k − 1 , (1.37)
where G stands for the Gini coefficient. Realistic values of the Gini coefficient
vary from 0.2 to 0.6 (see Table 1.1 below) implying k’s in the range of 3 and 4
3
.
Table 1.1: International comparison of Gini coefficients (Source: Human Develop-
ment Report 2007/2008, United Nations Development Programme)
Country Gini   Country Gini   Country Gini   Country Gini 
Denmark 0.25  Yemen 0.33  Malawi 0.39  Mexico 0.46 
Japan 0.25  Switzerland 0.34  Mauritania 0.39  Rwanda 0.47 
Sweden 0.25  Armenia 0.34  Israel 0.39  
People's Republic of 
China 0.47 
Czech Republic 0.25  Kazakhstan 0.34  Burkina Faso 0.40  Guinea-B ss u 0.47 
Norway 0.26  Greece 0.34  Morocco 0.40  Nepal 0.47 
Slovakia 0.26  Indonesia 0.34  Tunisia 0.40  Mozambique 0.47 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.26  Ireland 0.34  Russia 0.40  Madagascar 0.48 
Finland 0.27  Egypt 0.34  Mali 0.40  Venezuela 0.48 
Hungary 0.27  Vietnam 0.34  Sri Lanka 0.40  Malaysia 0.49 
Ukraine 0.28  Poland 0.35  Georgia 0.40  Costa Rica 0.50 
Germany 0.28  Laos 0.35  Ghana 0.41  Zimbabwe 0.50 
Slovenia 0.28  Tanzania 0.35  Turkmenistan 0.41  The Gambia 0.50 
Croatia 0.29  Spain 0.35  United States 0.41  Swaziland 0.50 
Austria 0.29  Australia 0.35  Senegal 0.41  Niger 0.51 
Bulgaria 0.29  Algeria 0.35  Cambodia 0.42  Zambia 0.51 
Belarus 0.30  Estonia 0.36  Thailand 0.42  Papua New Guinea 0.51 
Ethiopia 0.30  Italy 0.36  Burundi 0.42  Argentina 0.51 
Kyrgyzstan 0.30  Lithuania 0.36  Kenya 0.43  Dominican Republic 0.52 
Pakistan 0.31  United Kingdom 0.36  Singapore 0.43  Peru 0.52 
Netherlands 0.31  New Zealand 0.36  Iran 0.43  El Salvador 0.52 
Romania 0.31  Azerbaijan 0.37  Nicaragua 0.43  Ecuador 0.54 
Albania 0.31  Benin 0.37  Hong Kong 0.43  Honduras 0.54 
South Korea 0.32  India 0.37  Turkey 0.44  Chile 0.55 
Canada 0.33  Uzbekistan 0.37  Nigeria 0.44  Guatemala 0.55 
Tajikistan 0.33  Latvia 0.38  Philippines 0.45  Panama 0.56 
France 0.33  Portugal 0.39  Cameroon 0.45  Brazil 0.57 
Mongolia 0.33  Guinea 0.39  Côte d'Ivoire 0.45  South Africa 0.58 
Belgium 0.33  Jordan 0.39  Uruguay 0.45  Paraguay 0.58 
Moldova 0.33  
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.39  Jamaica 0.46  Colombia 0.59 
Bangladesh 0.33   
Republic of 
Macedonia 0.39   Uganda 0.46   Haiti 0.59 
Source: Human Development Report 2007/2008, United Nations Development Programme 2007.  
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The relationship between the fee level and A under the Pareto distri-
bution of initial wealth
We first focus on the relationship between the fee level and the size of the parameter
A (i.e. the inverse of noise). As A represents the expected probability of success
of the borrowers who believe themselves to be good, we expect reasonable values
of this parameter to be between 0.5 and 0.8.
We set the remaining parameters to be p1 = 0.95, X = 1.3 (i.e. we assume 30%
return to the project) and k = 2.5 (corresponding to the Gini coefficient equal to
0.25). The values of the fee C implied by these parameters and by the values of
A within the range of 0.55 and 0.8 are depicted on Figure 1.1 below.
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Figure 1.1: The relationship between the fee level and A under the Pareto distri-
bution of initial wealth)
The illustration shows that under reasonable assumptions about the parameter
values the fee level is negatively related to the value of the parameter A, implying
that it is positively related to the level of noise and negatively related to the quality
of testing.
The relationship between the fee level and initial wealth inequality un-
der the Pareto distribution of initial wealth
Next, we focus on the relationship between the fee level and the degree of the bor-
rowers’ initial wealth inequality measured by the parameter k. Thus, we calculate
the fee levels for k within the range of 1.5 to 3 which corresponds to the Gini
coefficients between 0.5 and 0.2. We choose A = 0.75 and keep the remaining pa-
rameters on the same level as above. The implied values of the fee C are depicted
on Figure 1.2 below.
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Figure 1.2: The relationship between the fee level and k (under the Pareto distri-
bution of initial wealth)
The illustration shows that under reasonable assumptions about the parameters
values the fee level is negatively related to the value of the parameter k and thus
also positively related to the degree of the borrowers’ initial wealth inequality (the
Gini coefficient).
Log-normal distribution













where µ and σ are parameters which we have to specify.





where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distri-
bution.
The relationship between the fee level and A under the Log-normal
distribution of initial wealth
As in the case of the Pareto distribution, we first focus on the relationship between
the fee level and the size of the parameter A (i.e. the inverse of noise). We again
choose the value of the Gini coefficient to be equal to 0.25 and we also choose the
mean of the distribution representing the average initial wealth in the population to
be equal to 0.4, i.e. slightly less than a half of the size of the project17 (we focus on
the relationship between these parameters and the fee level later in the Appendix).
The choice of the Gini coefficient determines the value of the parameter σ which
together with the selected value of the mean determines the parameter µ through
the following expression for the mean E of the Log-normal distribution




We keep the remaining parameters p1 and X on the same level as in the case
of the Pareto distribution (i.e. p1 = 0.95 and X = 1.3). The values of the fee C
implied by these parameters and by the values of A within the range of 0.55 and
0.8 are depicted on Figure 1.3 below.
The illustration shows that the fee level is again negatively related to the value
of the parameter A, implying that it is positively related to the level of noise and
17For this value of the distribution mean we receive results very close to the previous illustration
with the Pareto distribution; however, the negative relationship between the parameter A and
the fee level holds also for other values of the distribution mean, very similar results were received
for values 0.3 and 0.5, for example.
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Figure 1.3: The relationship between the fee level and A (under the Log-normal
distribution of initial wealth)













negatively related to the quality of testing.
The relationship between the fee level and initial wealth inequality un-
der the Log-normal distribution of initial wealth
We proceed to the illustration of the relationship between the fee level and the
degree of the borrowers’ initial wealth inequality measured by the Gini coefficient.
We choose A = 0.75 and keep the remaining parameters on the same level as
above. The mean of the distribution together with σ implied by the Gini coefficient
determines the value of µ. The values of the fee C implied by these parameters and
by the values of the Gini coefficient within the range of 0.2 and 0.5 are depicted
on Figure 1.4 below.
The illustration shows that the fee level is again positively related to the degree
of the borrowers’ initial wealth inequality (the Gini coefficient).
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Figure 1.4: The relationship between the fee level and the Gini index (under the
Log-normal distribution of initial wealth)














The relationship between the fee level and average initial wealth under
the Log-normal distribution of initial wealth
Finally, we focus on the relationship between the fee level and the average initial
wealth. The Gini coefficient is set to be equal to 0.25 and thus the value of σ is
determined. We keep the parameters X, p1 and A on the same levels as in the
previous part, i.e. they equal to 1.3, 0.95 and 0.75, respectively. The values of
the fee C implied by these parameters and by the values of average initial wealth
within the range of 0.3 and 0.7 are depicted on Figure 1.5 below.
The illustration shows that the fee level is positively related to the value of
average initial wealth. However, Figure 1.6 shows that our results imply a negative
relationship between the average initial wealth and the fee level as a share of the
average initial wealth.
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Figure 1.5: The relationship between the fee level and the average initial wealth
(under the Log-normal distribution of initial wealth)
Figure 1.6: The relationship between the fee level as a share of the average initial
wealth and the average initial wealth (under the Log-normal distribution of initial
wealth)


































1.5.4 Empirical evidence on international differences in fees
The following chart illustrates the international differences in retail bank fees scaled
by the GDP per capita in the given country. The fees are measured by a fee index
calculated by Capgemini, EFMA and ING (2005).
Figure 1.7: Prices of core banking services versus GDP per inhabitant (percent)






































































Figure 1.8: Prices of core banking services versus GDP per inhabitant (percent)
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Credit Bureaus as a Competition
Softening Device under
Transactional Banking
(Joint work with Petr Chovanec)
Abstract
In this chapter we modify the Broecker (1990) model of interbank competition with
costless testing by introducing credit bureau services. Unlike Broecker, we show
that there exists a symmetrical pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which all banks
fully use the credit bureau services. We show that this pure strategy equilibrium
can be interpreted as a competition softening (tacit collusion) outcome because
credit bureaus allow banks to coordinate on loan rates independent on marginal
costs. Compared to the existing models, our results are not based on the existence
of informational rents and thus they hold even under transactional banking. The
higher is the number of banks the less likely is the competition softening outcome
(the conditions for the competition softening equilibrium are less likely to be sat-
isfied) and thus there exists the optimal number of banks in the market under the
conditions of free entry.
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2.1 Introduction
Information sharing through bank credit bureaus or public credit registers1 plays
an important role in the interaction between banks and borrowers in the credit
market. Some form of information sharing between banks exists in almost all
developed and emerging countries around the world, though the specific form of
information sharing may differ significantly across countries2.
Four main reasons for the existence of information sharing between banks have
been identified in the literature3. Specifically, credit bureaus decrease the degree
of asymmetric information between banks and borrowers, decrease borrowers’ in-
centives to moral hazard, act as a barrier against borrowers’ over-indebtedness and
finally soften competition between banks through the reduction of informational
rents obtained by banks in the relationship with their clients4. In this paper, we
make a contribution related to the competition softening rationale for inter-bank
information sharing.
The current explanation of the competition softening effect relies on the as-
sumption of a longer lasting relationship between a bank and its borrowers. The
bank can secure valuable informational rents on future lending (repeated lending
contracts) only by first getting to know the borrower in the first lending contract.
The existence of these informational rents motivates banks to compete today ag-
gressively for tomorrow’s rents. Sharing information about the borrowers’ quality
decreases these rents and thus also makes competition between banks less ag-
1For a review of the different types of information sharing instruments see Section 2.2.
2For the different forms of information sharing see for example Jappelli and Pagano (2005).
3For a comprehensive review of the theoretical reasons for credit bureaus and public credit
registers see Japelli and Pagano (2005)
4These reasons are discussed in greater detail in the literature review in Section 2.3.
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gressive5. The crucial assumption of the banks’ expectation of a longer lasting
relationship with their clients can be identified with the presence of relationship
banking.
However, relationship banking is only one of two main forms of banking ap-
proaches to the credit market in general. Apart from relationship banking, banks
also use transactional banking which can be defined as a bank offering targeted
at clients who are not expected to stay with the bank for a longer time period.
The bank is obviously not able to benefit from the improved knowledge about
the client’s characteristics under transactional banking. Which one of the two
approaches becomes more prevalent in a specific banking market depends on a
number of factors, the degree of competition being one of the crucial ones6. Thus,
the banking markets in different countries may greatly differ in the relative impor-
tance of relationship and transactional banking depending on how competitive are
the banking markets in these countries. Some authors even argue that the current
trend in general seems to be a move of mainstream banking institutions from re-
lationship banking to the stronger use of credit scoring7. Relationship banking is
also relatively less relevant in the case of retail banking as repeated borrowing is
relatively less likely for households than for firms (for example, a typical household
can be expected to take only one mortgage in its lifetime).
We present a model showing that inter-bank information sharing through credit
bureaus or public credit registers makes competition less intense (leads to the
competition softening effect) even under transactional banking. Thus, we show
5See the discussion of Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) in the Literature Review.
6The effect of competition on relationship banking is studied by Petersen and Rajan (1995),
Boot and Thakor (2000) or Degryse and Ongena (2007).
7See for example Holmes, Isham, Petersen and Sommers (2007).
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the competition softening effect of information sharing can be also expected in
segments or even countries with a transactional banking environment.
Besides being a contribution to the literature on the alternative rationales for
the inter-bank information sharing through credit bureaus or public credit regis-
ters, our model also contributes to the literature on competitive equilibria under
asymmetric information in banking. We argue that credit bureaus or public credit
registers can play an equilibrating role and prevent the inter-bank competition
from resorting to mixed strategy zero profit outcomes which we don’t see in real-
ity.
The paper is organized in the following way. In the next section, we briefly
review the different forms of interbank information sharing mechanisms relevant
to our model. Next, we review the relevant literature and move to the exposition
of the model. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our research.
2.2 Alternative forms of interbank information
sharing
The purpose of this section is to briefly describe the alternative forms of interbank
information sharing relevant to our model. It is not meant to be a comprehensive
overview of all the possibilities which can be found in practice. Most of the material
in this section is based on Jappelli and Pagano (2005) who provide a thorough
discussion of the subject (the historical background overview is based on Miller
(2000)).
Generally, the two main types of information sharing mechanisms are credit
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bureaus and public credit registers. The distinguishing feature between the two
is the nature of their membership. Credit bureaus are characterized by voluntary
membership based on reciprocity of its members whereas public credit registers
have mandatory membership and usually all loans above some selected threshold
size must be reported. Although most countries have some form of information
sharing mechanism in place, the specific use of credit bureaus and public credit
registers varies significantly between countries. The information sharing system of
a given country can be based either on a credit bureau only, public credit register
only or both mechanisms simultaneously.
Credit bureaus are the prevailing form of interbank information sharing in the
US. Since the nineties the industry has gone through the process of consolidation
resulting in the current dominant position of three main credit bureaus, Equifax,
Experian and Trans Union in the consumer credit market and Dun and Bradstreet
in the small business market. Contrary to the US, public credit registers are used
in many European countries, often in combination with private credit bureaus
(the first public credit register in Germany was set up in 1934). Generally, public
credit registers and credit bureaus boomed in the nineties of the last century as a
result of the negative experience with the severe financial crises around the world
(e.g. the Mexican credit bureau system established in 1995 was supported by the
government after the end of the Tequila crisis).
The information shared through a credit bureau or a public credit register is
usually categorized as being either negative or positive (black or white informa-
tion). Negative information usually consists of information about the borrower’s
past defaults and other loan repayment delinquencies. Positive information may
include information such as the borrower’s account balances or balance sheet in-
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formation in the case of corporate borrowers. Credit bureaus may also provide
some additional services derived from negative and positive information such as
credit scoring.
Besides the negative and positive information, credit bureaus and public credit
registers usually also provide information which can be used to infer the borrower’s
application history. Specifically, a borrower’s credit report usually includes infor-
mation about credit inquiries over a given time period (typically several years),
i.e. a list of all subjects who have requested the borrower’s credit report. The
credit report further distinguishes between voluntary (approved by the borrower
applying for a loan) and involuntary credit inquiries (usually used by financial
institutions for targeted offerings for their clients). The information about the
voluntary inquiries together with the information about the borrower’s existing
loans can be used to infer her application history. This can be understood as a
specific type of information falling between the traditional categories of negative
and positive information.
The model presented in this paper relates to both credit bureaus and public
credit registers. Information sharing is beneficial for banks in our model and thus
the existence of information sharing does not depend on the mandatory mem-
bership of the public credit registers because banks are naturally motivated to
support the creation of a credit bureau. We use the assumption that the infor-
mation shared is the borrower’s application history. The results of the model are
robust to the alternative assumptions about what information is being shared.
Specifically, analogous results can be obtained even if banks share the information
about the borrower’s past defaults. We assume sharing the information about
application history because we want to show that sharing this type of informa-
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tion can be valuable for banks (to our best knowledge, we are the first to point
this out) and also because this assumption is more relevant to the transactional
banking environment we are interested in modeling.
2.3 Literature Review
The seminal paper in the literature on credit bureaus and public credit registers
is Jappelli and Pagano (1993) who show that credit bureaus can be beneficial
for banks by decreasing the adverse selection effects implied by the asymmetric
information between banks and borrowers. Banks in their model are assumed to be
monopolies in local markets whereas borrowers are mobile and a fraction of them
randomly moves between the markets. Banks know the borrowers’ characteristics
in their local market but don’t know the type of the borrowers coming from other
markets. The exchange of information with the banks from other markets improves
the bank’s knowledge about the incoming borrowers. Jappelli and Pagano show
that information sharing is more likely to be adopted by banks the higher is the
mobility of borrowers, the more heterogeneous they are and the higher is the
number of banks. On the other hand, information sharing is less likely when
markets are contestable. Volume of lending is higher under information sharing
when adverse selection is sufficiently severe.
Pagano and Padilla (2000) use a two-period model of bank competition to show
the disciplining effect of credit bureaus. Banks have perfect information about their
clients but don’t know anything about the other banks’ clients. Perfect information
means banks can extract all surplus from their clients, thus, entrepreneurs don’t
have incentives to invest into improving their business. Under information sharing,
61
there is a symmetric competition in the second stage - the competition is thus more
intense implying that surplus is shared between banks and entrepreneurs (second
period informational rents are decreased). The borrowers’ incentives are thus
increased. From the banks’ viewpoint, the first period profit is increased due to
higher borrowers’ effort (effort for both periods is chosen prior to any borrowing)
and the second period profit is decreased due to more intense competition. In
an alternative setup, Pagano and Padilla show that sharing information about
borrowers’ past defaults can be used as a tool against the negative effects of the
borrowers’ over-indebtedness.
Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) show that information sharing through credit bu-
reaus or public credit registers might also be anti-competitive. They illustrate their
point on a simple two period model of banking competition. Without information
sharing, banks engage in aggressive first period competition for the second period
informational rents. Information sharing makes the second period competition
symmetric, informational rents are eliminated and the first period competition is
thus less intensive and profits are increased.
Bouckaert and Degryse (2002) present a similar idea. They build a two-period
model of endogenous incumbency, in which in the first period firms fight for the
second period incumbency. Information sharing lowers the second period entry
barriers and thus it also softens the first period competition.
The presence of a bank-borrower relationship is the crucial assumption behind
the two last models mentioned above. We show that similar effect occurs even
without this restrictive assumption. Also, none of the models reviewed above
focuses on the potential effects of sharing the information about the borrowers’ loan
application history (the existing literature deals with the sharing of the information
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about borrowers’ performance in the repayment of loans that have already been
awarded to them or the information about the borrowers’ quality). Furthermore,
none of the models focuses on the interaction of information sharing and screening
(testing) of borrowers. In our paper, we argue that sharing the information about
the borrowers’ loan application history might have important implications for the
efficiency of the bank’s testing procedures.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on credit market equilibrium under
asymmetric information. Specifically, it shows that information sharing may lead
to pure strategy equilibrium in a model conceptually based on the seminal work of
Broecker (1990). Broecker models bank competition with costless screening and
finds that there are no pure strategy equilibria, only mixed strategy equilibria ex-
ist with banks earning zero profits. This result follows from a negative externality
of testing - the more banks are active in the market, the worse distribution of
borrowers is faced by each of the banks (borrowers can apply to more than one
bank). Interest rates are shown to be rising in the degree of competition (num-
ber of banks) as the higher number of banks increases the probability of a bad
project passing the screening test of at least one bank in the market. There are
no pure strategy equilibria because undercutting other banks is profitable even if
the current rates equal marginal costs - the lower rate attracts the best borrowers
and thus improves the pool of borrowers faced by the undercutting bank. Thus,
the model leads to the unrealistic result of erratic movements of interest rates and
zero profits of banks.
A number of authors have tried to find reasonable explanations why we don’t
see such outcomes in reality. Gehrig (1998) builds on the approach of Broecker
(1990) and models competition between banks which can choose the level of their
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screening intensity. He shows that increased competition may lead to lower incen-
tives to screen. There are two opposing effects of increased competition on the
level of interest rates - traditional competition effect leading in the direction of de-
creasing the rates and an information effect leading in the direction of increasing
rates due to the worse pool of borrowers. Gehrig studies two industry cases: 1) the
game of incumbent and an entrant case in which the entrant might choose not to
screen at all and charge higher rates while the incumbent screens intensively in a
pure strategy equilibrium and 2) simultaneous oligopolistic competition in which
no pure strategy equilibria exist with screening and a no screening pure strategy
equilibrium exists.
Freixas et al. (2004) extends the Broecker (1990) model by introducing small
application costs and convex screening costs. The introduction of small application
fees leads to sequential application process - borrowers who do not pass the test at
the first bank go to the second bank, if again they fail to pass the test, they go to
yet another bank etc. The pool of borrowers faced by each individual bank is again
worse the more banks there are. The introduction of the convex screening costs is
then shown to lead to the existence of pure strategy equilibria. The increase in the
screening costs might offset the improvement in the borrowers’ pool rendering the
undercutting strategy unprofitable. However, the model rests on the questionable
assumption of convex screening costs.
In this paper, we show that information sharing through credit bureaus can be




The setup of our model is conceptually based on the Broecker (1990) setup. Our
model contains an additional element – the information sharing mechanism in the
form of a credit bureau (or a public credit register). Credit bureau is modeled as
additional information available to banks participating in the credit bureau system
– each of these banks can see how many times a given borrower has already been
denied credit before applying to this bank. We also assume that due to the credit
bureau system, borrowers apply sequentially and not simultaneously (i.e. they are
allowed to file one loan application at a time)8.
Let’s assume there is a unit mass of potential borrowers of two types - good
(subscript a) and bad (subscript b), in proportions l and 1 − l respectively (the
proportions are common knowledge). The borrowers have the opportunity to invest
in a project which requires initial investment of 1 unit of money and returns either
0 or Xi units of money, where i stands for a or b. Although it is reasonable
to expect Xa ≥ Xb due to the difference in quality between the two types of
borrowers, we assume Xa = Xb without loss of generality. The probability of
successfully completing the project is pi, with pa > pb. Borrowers have no initial
wealth endowment and thus they have to borrow 1 unit of money from a bank if
they desire to invest in the project.
There are N banks which can screen the borrowers by imperfect tests and
charge interest rate rn. The costless screening technology is exogenously given. In
8For example, simultaneous applications are reported by the credit bureau and only one loan
application (randomly chosen) continues.
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every period, banks first announce their rates and then borrowers choose a bank
and apply for a loan from the chosen bank. We assume that due to the credit
bureau system, in every period a borrower can apply only to one bank9. In this
sequential application process, borrowers first go to the cheapest bank. If they
pass the screening test then they get the loan from this bank and leave the pool of
applicants. If however they are rejected then they go to the second cheapest bank
in the next period and so on10. The tests of different banks are independent and
thus the sequential application works even if two or more banks charge exactly
the same rates (it is chosen randomly to which bank the borrowers go first in that
case). The screening test assigns either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject) to each borrower.
The technology is defined by the following a priori probabilities: q(0|a) = qa,
q(1|a) = 1− qa, q(0|b) = qb, q(1|b) = 1− qb. We also assume that 0 < qa < qb < 1.
2.4.2 Solution of the Model
Let us look for a symmetrical equilibrium with information sharing facilitated by
the credit bureau. From the banks’ viewpoint, each of the banks is approached by
N different types of borrowers - these borrowers are differentiated by the number
of tests they have already failed before approaching the current bank. Banks are
thus able to charge different rates to these different types of borrowers (this could
be seen as a type of price discrimination based on risk-adjusted pricing).
We base our solution of the model on the following simple insight. The rates for
the N -th type of borrowers (i.e. those who have failed N − 1 times already before
9This assumption guarantees that a bank cannot do unlimited screening and thus cannot
get information of the same quality as the information received through the information sharing
mechanism from the other banks, even though the screening technology is assumed to be costless.
10They cannot go to the same bank twice because this bank already knows the result of the
test.
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applying to the current bank - let us call these borrowers the N -th level) will be
set equal to X because the borrowers of the N -th type have no other chance than
to accept the offer of the last bank11. The bank can thus charge these borrowers
their maximum willingness to pay.
Let’s denote the profit each of the banks in the equilibrium gets from the N -th
level as P . Then in the equilibrium, the rates for the (N − 1)-st level have to be
set to a level that leads to the same per-level profit P as in the case of the N -th
level. This is always possible for two reasons: 1) there are more applicants on the
(N − 1)-st level than on the N -th level (some of the applicants on the (N − 1)-st
level pass the tests, become clients and leave the pool of applicants), 2) the average
quality of the borrowers on the N -th level is lower than that of the borrowers on
the (N − 1)-st level. Thus the room for profit is always greater on the (N − 1)-st
level than on the N -th level.
This leads us to the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1 If X is greater than the break-even rate for the N-th level r0 implicitly
defined by (1− qa)qN−1a l(par0 − 1) + (1− qb)qN−1b (1− l)(pbr0 − 1) = 0, then there
exists an equilibrium12 with the loan rates given by the backward induction process
11This is true if X is larger than the break-even rate for this level - we discuss what happens
otherwise later.
12Moreover, there are other equilibria which have the same rates, but some banks decide not
to provide credit in some levels. These equilibria are comparable in the sense that they have the
same profit and rates. Their existence does not affect the presented implications of the model
but they are mathematically challenging. Therefore, we do not take them into account here.
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described above, i.e. they are implicitly defined by
(1− qa)qN−1a l(paX − 1) + (1− qb)qN−1b (1− l)(pbX − 1) =
= (1− qa)qN−2a l(parN−1 − 1) + (1− qb)qN−2b (1− l)(pbrN−1 − 1) =
= (1− qa)qN−3a l(parN−2 − 1) + (1− qb)qN−3b (1− l)(pbrN−2 − 1) =
...
= (1− qa)l(par1 − 1) + (1− qb)(1− l)(pbr1 − 1), (2.1)
where rN−1 stands for the rate for the (N − 1)-st level of borrowers, rN−2 for the
rate for the (N − 2)-nd level etc (rN = X).
Proof 2.1 See the Appendix.
Lemma 2.1 implies that the specified pure strategy equilibrium exists whenever
the N -th level of borrowers is ex-ante profitable for a bank, i.e. whenever
(1− qa)qN−1a l(paX − 1) + (1− qb)qN−1b (1− l)(pbX − 1) ≥ 0, (2.2)
which is more likely to be satisfied the higher are the parameters X, pa, pb, l
and the lower is the number of banks N . The relationship to qa and qb is more
complicated as the left-hand side of the above inequality is generally not monotonic
in these two parameters.
What happens when X is lower than the break-even rate for the last level?
In that case, there is a Bertrand-type competition between banks for each of the
levels of borrowers with the result of zero profit for all banks. For each level of
borrowers, each of the banks is tempted to undercut the other banks in order to
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increase its pool of borrowers. Banks compete only for the levels of borrowers who
are ex-ante profitable for them. This means the number of the levels for which
banks compete is strictly smaller than the number of banks and thus all borrowers
always have a choice which bank to apply to. Thus, banks cannot apply monopoly
power with respect to any of the borrowers.
Importantly, the higher is the number of banks, the less likely is the existence
of the competition softening pure strategy equilibrium. The more banks there are,
the higher is the probability that X is lower than the break-even rate for the last
level in which case there is only the zero-profit pure strategy equilibrium. This is
because the average quality of each additional level of borrowers is worse compared
to the previous level.
The crucial result of interest for us is that the loan rates determined by the
backward induction process described above are clearly independent on marginal
costs and thus allow space for positive economic profit for banks. Information shar-
ing facilitated by the credit bureau system effectively gives banks greater market
power with respect to borrowers. Importantly, this effect is not dependent on
any dynamics implied by the continuation of the bank-borrower contract and thus
it is relevant even for one-shot encounters between banks and borrowers in the
environment of transactional banking.
2.4.3 Extension of the Model
In the model described above, we assumed that the borrowers’ application process
is sequential due to the existence of the interbank information sharing mechanism,
i.e. the credit bureaus or public credit registers. However, it could be argued
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that in the model described above, banks can achieve the same sequentiality by
announcing that they will test loan applicants only at certain specified time points,
i.e. they will carry out only one stage of the described application and testing
process at a time (e.g. on a specified day once in a week). Although unrealistic,
such a setting would allow banks to distinguish the different levels of borrowers even
without the information sharing mechanism because only one level of borrowers
will appear at the banks’ doors every period and banks would always know with
certainty which level they are facing in a given period.
In order to show that our results do not depend on the specific setup described
above, we now discuss an alternative setup which is derived from the original one
but is robust to the objection expressed in the previous paragraph. Specifically,
every period a unit mass of borrowers of the two types is born and the game has
infinitely many stages. Furthermore, we assume banks discount future streams of
payoffs by a discount factor δ. Otherwise, the setup is the same as in the original
game.
The main distinguishing feature of the new setup is that banks are always
(with the exception of the very first period) faced by a mixture of different levels
of borrowers so that there is always uncertainty about what level a specific borrower
belongs to. Specifically, in the first stage there are only level-one borrowers. In the
second stage there is a number of level-two borrowers (those rejected in the first
period) and a unit mass of level-one borrowers (the newborn ones). The mixture
of borrower types in the other stages can be derived analogously.
The solution of this infinitely repeated game depends on the size of the discount
factor δ. Intuitively, for high enough δ any feasible outcome at least as good as the
zero profit solution can be supported by suitable strategies as a Nash equilibrium
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of the repeated game, no matter whether the interbank information sharing mech-
anism is in place (this follows from the folk theorem13). Thus, even the solution
that all banks charge rates equal to X in every stage can be supported as a Nash
equilibrium of the game (e.g. when all banks use trigger strategies). On the other
hand, for extremely small δ the zero profit solution is the only solution, no matter
whether the interbank information sharing mechanism is in place (banks do not
care about the future).
The interesting case for us is when the discount factor δ takes on intermediate
values such that neither of the two extremes described above applies. In such a
case, each bank has a motivation to undercut the others and seize the whole market
in the first period. Thus, the collusion equilibrium is not attainable and banks (if
an interbank information sharing system is in place) revert to the non-cooperative
equilibrium described in the previous section for each of the generations of bor-
rowers (we define the generation of borrowers as all the borrowers who were born
to the model in a given period).
It should be obvious that the attractiveness of the collusion equilibrium also
depends on the number of banks in the market. For a higher number of banks
the difference between the per-period collusion profit (the profit obtained from
charging X to the N -th of the market) and the one-time per-period profit from
deviation (the profit obtained from undercutting the other banks and seizing the
whole market) is obviously higher and thus the attractiveness of sticking to the
collusion equilibrium is smaller. This means that under free entry, the viability of
collusion depends not only on the size of the discount factor δ but also on whether
the non-cooperative equilibrium leads to the zero-profit Bertrand outcome or the
13For the discussion of the folk theorem see for example Kreps (1990).
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competition softening outcome as defined in the previous section (i.e. whether
X is smaller or greater than the break-even interest rate for the N -th level of
borrowers).
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that interbank information sharing through credit
bureaus or public credit registers may lead to softer competition (prices set in-
dependently of marginal costs) even under transactional banking (one-shot bank-
borrower encounters, borrowers have to borrow funds only once). This result
complements the findings of the existing literature in which the same result has
been shown to hold for the case of relationship banking (repeated bank-borrower
encounters, borrowers need to borrow funds more than once).
Our results can be seen as an addition to the list of alternative rationales for
interbank information sharing because it can be concluded from our results that
the assumed form of interbank information sharing is beneficial from the banks’
point of view. Our results follow from the fact that banks do not have to compete
for the borrowers who were previously rejected by all the other banks and thus
they can exercise monopoly market power in relation to this type of borrowers.
When an equilibrium exists in our model, the interest rates for the other types of
borrowers are then derived by a type of backward induction process assuring no
bank has a motivation to deviate from the resulting equilibrium.
We used the assumption that banks share the information about the borrowers’
application history instead of the information about the borrowers’ past defaults
as in the existing literature. We have shown that this type of information can
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prove to be very valuable for banks as a tool for increasing their profits (to our
best knowledge, this has not been pointed out yet in the theoretical literature).
However, we argue that the same results hold even with the traditional assumption
that banks share the information about the borrowers’ past defaults instead of the
information about the application history.
Our paper also has important policy relevance. Firstly, the sequentiality of the
borrowers’ application process facilitated through a credit bureau or a public credit
register serves as a stabilizing factor preventing the erratic movements of interest
rates implied by a repeated mixed strategy equilibrium. Secondly, the existence
of the competition softening pure strategy equilibrium in our model is more likely
the lower is the number of banks in the market. As the competition softening pure
strategy equilibrium can be interpreted as a more stable equilibrium compared to
the zero-profit one (higher capital buffers due to higher banks’ profits), we can
conclude that our model implies that the increase in the number of banks active
in the market with interbank information sharing may have a destabilizing effect
on the local banking industry (local in the sense of the scope of the information
sharing mechanism)14. Thirdly, if we allow for free entry, there is a maximum
number of banks that choose to be active in the market. Thus, our model leads
to a type of natural oligopoly industry structure in banking.
14Specifically, the banks’ economic profit drops to zero when the addition of the last marginal
bank to the banking industry leads to X being smaller than the break-even rate r0 defined above.
Of course, the implications for banking stability would have to be supported by a richer model
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Consider the case with N = 2. In order to prove the existence of an equilibrium,
we have to show that no bank is tempted to deviate from the candidate for an
equilibrium. In this candidate, in each level, every bank gains P . Let us first
look at the motivation to undercut by ε on the first level (i.e., charging a lower
rate for the yet untested borrowers). The undercutting bank would attract all
the borrowers on the first level (i.e. all the borrowers in the market would first
go to the undercutting bank). This would lead to the profit of 2(P − ε∗) for the
undercutting bank which is clearly smaller than 2P under the equilibrium strategy
(the undercutting bank would obviously not have any profit from the second level
because all borrowers would have already applied to this bank on the first level).
Let us now consider the motivation to charge a higher rate to the yet untested
borrowers - i.e. the overcharging strategy. The overcharging bank would deliber-
ately forgo any profit from the first level (all the borrowers would first go to the
other bank) but it would get a potentially positive profit from the second level.
This profit would be equal to 2P as the overcharging bank would be approached
by all the second level borrowers. If we assume that banks stick to the equilibrium
strategy if indifferent between the equilibrium and some alternative strategy (there
might be some small menu costs which favor the status quo) then the equilibrium
in the case of N = 2 is proved.
Let us now generalize to the case of N > 2. Let us look for a symmetrical
information-sharing equilibrium again (we will subsequently show that this equi-
librium is unique). The rates charged by banks to the last level of borrowers must
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again be equal to X. We claim that the rates charged to the lower levels of bor-
rowers must again be set to such levels that the expected profit from each of the
levels of borrowers is equal to P . Let us consider the case of N = 3 – the same
argument applies to all the cases of N > 2. We can use the same argumentation
as above to show that no bank is tempted to undercut or overcharge the rate set
by other banks for the second level without changing the rate for the first level
too; thus, we have to test only the optimality of the deviations from the first level
and the of the combined deviations from the first and second level. When one of
the banks undercuts on the first level then it gets 3(P − ε) < 3P which means it
will decrease its profit relative to the equilibrium strategy. When the bank instead
overcharges on the first level then it forgoes all profit from the first level as all the
yet untested borrowers go to the other two banks. That means that on the second
level half of the borrowers can go either to the first bank or the third (the deviating
one) and the other half of the borrowers can go either to the second bank or the
third. Thus, on average one half of the borrowers will go to the third bank on the
second level. This in turn means that the profit of the third bank from the second
level will be 3
2
(in equilibrium, P is obtained from one third of borrowers). On the
third level, the borrowers who went to the first bank on the second level (of mass
equal to 1
4
) and the borrowers who went to the second bank on the second level (of
mass equal to 1
4
) will go to the deviating bank. That means that the profit of the
deviating bank from the third level is also 3
2
. The total profit from overcharging
on the first level is thus 3P as in the equilibrium.
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Chapter 3
New Insights about the
Separability of Loans and
Deposits Decisions in the
Monti-Klein Model of Banking
Industry
Abstract
It is shown that it is enough to introduce small changes to the industry structure
of the original Monti-Klein model for the independence between the banks’ loans
and deposits decisions to break down. Thus, the interdependence result arises even
under less drastic changes to the original Monti-Klein model than in the existing
literature. The results about the relationship between the loans and deposits de-
cisions have important policy implications - especially for the optimality of the
popular deposit interest rate regulation which has recently received renewed inter-
est in the literature on banking regulation.
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3.1 Introduction
Although there are many alternative models, the oligopoly version of the Monti-
Klein model1 still ranks among the most popular Industrial Organization models of
the banking industry. The model has been frequently used in empirical work. Some
of the more recent papers include de Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2003), Bruggeman
and Donnay (2003) or de Guevara and Maudos (2004). The popularity of the
Monti-Klein model can arguably be attributed to its simplicity but also to its
relative power in modeling the effects of the most frequently discussed issues about
the conduct and performance of the banking industry.
However, even the well accepted Monti-Klein model is not free of controversies.
One of the most debated ones is the question of the separability of the decisions
about loans and deposits in the banks’ optimization problem. The question of
separability has strong links to banking regulation. If the decisions about loans
and deposits are interdependent then severe competition in deposits might lead to
excessively high interest rates on loans (high deposit rates driven up by competition
inflate the costs of resources and banks are tempted to compensate for these higher
costs by increasing rates charged to borrowers). This has led many governments
to impose ceilings on deposit rates - a regulatory instrument which has become
very popular in many countries around the world including the United States
where it was known as Regulation Q2. However, if the decisions about loans and
1The Monti-Klein model is based on the work of Klein (1971) and Monti (1972); the oligopoly
version of the model is due to Freixas and Rochet (1997).
2In the USA, Regulation Q was enacted in 1933 and was removed in 1986 (it was phased-out
by the Monetary Control Act from 1980). Other countries with experience in deposit interest
rate control include France, Japan, China or Republic of Korea. The deposit rate controls have
recently received renewed interest in both theoretical and empirical literature (see e.g. Hellman
et. al [2000], Matutes and Vives [2000] or Kraft and Galac [2005]).
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deposits are independent then such a regulation has much weaker appeal. The
standard result of the basic Monti-Klein model is that (under the assumptions to
be discussed below) the two decision problems are indeed independent. Thus, the
Monti-Klein model in its original form implies that Regulation Q is a misguided
policy instrument which cannot achieve the intended objectives.
In reaction to the separability result of the Monti-Klein model, many authors
have tried to show that under some changed assumptions the loans and deposits
decisions can be interdependent. One approach has been to introduce risk of de-
fault into the model. Most notably, Dermine (1986) shows that loans and deposits
decisions are interdependent if the bank faces a positive probability of default (the
link between the two decisions is facilitated through the limited liability of the
bank). Another case of interdependence is discussed by Pringle (1973) who re-
laxes the assumption of a single decision period; Prisman et al. (1986) introduce
liquidity risk in a two-stage setting, Van Loo (1980) builds a model with liquidity
and solvency constraints and Broll, Pausch and Welzel (2002) achieve interdepen-
dence through hedging with basis risk. Interdependence is also the result of some
models not directly based on the Monti-Klein model. For example, Pyle (1971)
presents a different model in which the bank chooses between three securities -
one risk-less security and two securities with uncertain returns - loans with in-
terest rate r1 and deposits with interest rate r2. Pyle shows that in his model
the loans and deposits decisions are indeed interdependent if r1 and r2 are not
independent3. Finally Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1995) use a spatial
competition model to show that interdependence arises through tied sales which
3For a more detailed disscussion of Pyle’s model as well as of other similar models see for
example Baltensperger (1995) or Santomero (1994).
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become the optimal bank’s strategy after the deposit rates regulation is imposed.
All the reviewed models with interdependence between loans and deposits are
very complex when compared to the original Monti-Klein model. Their setups
depart unnecessarily far from the original model and thus significantly reduce the
generality of their implications. The complexity of these models also limits their
use in empirical work. In this chapter we show that even a relatively simple varia-
tion of the original model can give rise to the interdependence result. Specifically,
we show that it is enough to slightly modify the assumptions about the industry
structure by introducing positive fixed costs and a threat of entry. The issue of en-
try has already been introduced into the Monti-Klein framework by Toolsema and
Schoonbeek (1999) who have studied the Stackelberg version of the Monti-Klein
model. However, Toolsema and Schoonbeek (1999) have focused on the influence of
the changed assumptions about industry structure on the relationship between the
money market rate and the banks’ decisions about loans and deposits. Moreover,
they haven’t introduced barriers to entry. Thus, although their model is similar
to our approach in the assumed form of industry structure, it does not answer the
question of separability which is the goal of this chapter.
In this paper we show that under some very plausible assumptions about the
industry structure, the well known separability of (the independence of) the de-
cisions about the optimal levels of loans and deposits in the Monti-Klein model
breaks down. Compared to the other models with interdependence between loans
and deposits decisions, our approach is relatively closer to the original Monti-Klein
setup and thus it retains much of its simplicity and generality.
We present a simple model inspired by the standard incumbent/entrant game
in the spirit of the Bain-Sylos-Labini-Modigliani framework (BSM framework). We
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thus introduce barriers to mobility into the standard Monti-Klein model. Specif-
ically, we first present a two-stage game with quantity as the strategic variable
in the second (duopoly) stage of the two-stage game. Later we present a similar
model in which prices instead of quantities play the role of the strategic vari-
able and there is partial product differentiation so that it is possible to avoid the
Bertrand paradox. We are able to show that the banks’ decisions about loans
and deposits are interdependent - thus we reverse the basic result of the standard
Monti-Klein model of the banking industry.
3.2 Barriers to mobility in the Monti-Klein model
with Stackelberg competition
The simplest version of my model is based on a Stackleberg version of the standard
Monti-Klein model (for a review of the standard Monti-Klein model please refer to
the Appendix). By introducing sequential competition and barriers to entry, new
optimal strategy emerges - entry deterrence by the incumbent bank. This strategy
introduces a new optimization condition for the incumbent bank (it chooses loans
and deposits so as to drive entrant’s profits to zero). This condition involves both
deposits and loans and thus introduces the interdependence between the decisions
about loans and deposits.
The modification we propose is inspired by the standard incumbent-entrant
game in the traditional BSM framework4. The model is set up as a two-stage
4Tirole (2003) discusses the BSM framework in its general form. The novelty of our model
is in the incorporation of the simultaneous competition in inputs (deposits) and outputs (loans)
and also in the inclusion of the Monti-Klein type of perfectly elastic outside clearing (represented
by the interbank-lending rate r).
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game (rather than the one-stage game in the traditional Monti-Klein framework)
and the position of the competing banks is asymmetric - in the duopoly case, one
bank plays the role of the incumbent and the other assumes the role of the entrant.
Another crucial assumption is that there are fixed setup costs which have to be
incurred by any bank which plans to enter the banking industry5. Otherwise the
setup of the new model follows the setup of the standard Monti-Klein framework.
Specifically, we assume a downward sloping demand for loans L(rL), an upward
sloping supply of deposits D(rD) and the respective inverse functions rL(L) and
rD(D). The demand for loans and the supply of deposits are assumed to be
independent (otherwise the interdependence occurs trivially). Furthermore, there
is a perfectly elastic interbank market with exogenously given rate r. Bank i
takes the amount of loans and deposits chosen by the other banks as given and
maximizes its profit by the choice of the amount of loans Li it offers and the
amount of deposits Di it demands (i is 1 or 2 in duopoly). We assume the cost
function takes the additively separable form
C(Li, Di) = γLLi + γDDi (3.1)
because we concentrate only on the fundamental reasons for independence of the
loans and deposits decision problems.
In the first stage of the game, the incumbent chooses its amounts of deposits
and loans it wants to offer on the market. The entrant can observe these choices
5Fixed setup costs in banking are huge - especially in retail banking a successful bank needs
to have an extensive system of offices in order to attract customers; banks have to invest in
promotion of services in order to get the attention of customers, make investments into brand
building; moreover, even without physical fixed costs or legislative barriers, there would be huge
barriers to entry due to asymmetric information - see Dell’Ariccia, Friedman and Marquez (1999).
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of the incumbent and, depending on this information, decides whether or not to
enter the industry. In the second stage of the game, the entrant (if in the industry)
reacts optimally to the choices of the incumbent. Due to the presence of fixed setup
costs, the incumbent can potentially deter entry.
It is instructive to begin with the standard Stackelberg model without fixed
costs. In such a model, the entrant (let’s call it 2) maximizes the profit function
π2 = ((rL(L1 + L2)− r)L2 + (r(1− α)− rD(D1 + D2))D2 − γLL2 − γDD2) (3.2)
which leads to (analogously to the standard case reviewed in the Appendix) the
optimal choices (reaction functions)
L∗2 = L
∗
2(r, γL, L1) (3.3)
D∗2 = D
∗
2(r, α, γD, D1) (3.4)
The incumbent’s optimization problem is then to maximize the following profit
function
π1 = ((rL(L1 + L
∗
2(L1))− r)L1 + (r(1−α)− rD(D1 + D∗2(D1)))D1− γLL1− γDD1)
(3.5)
where L∗2(L1) and D
∗
2(D1) stand for the reaction functions from the entrant’s
problem. The first order conditions imply
rL(L1 + L
∗
2(L1))− r + r′L(L1 + L∗2(L1))(1 + L∗′2(L1))L1 − γL = 0 (3.6)
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r(1−α)− rD(D1 +D∗2(D1))−D′1(r′D(D1 +D∗2(D1))(1+D∗′2(D1))− γD = 0 (3.7)
Now it is clear that the incumbent’s optimal choices of loans and deposits are still







1(r, α, γD) (3.8)
Thus, the sole market leadership is not enough to break the independence of the
loans and deposits decision problems in the Monti-Klein model.
Now, let’s move to the more interesting case with the presence of the fixed
setup costs. The entrant’s profit function now changes to
π2 = (rL(L1 +L2)− r)L2 +(r(1−α)− rD(D1 +D2))D2−γLL2−γDD2−F, (3.9)
where F stands for the fixed setup costs which have to be incurred on entry. If the
entrant has to face positive fixed setup costs then the incumbent has to compare
the profitability of accommodation and entry deterrence. In other words, it has to
compute whether it is more profitable to let the entrant enter and make positive
profit or whether it is more profitable to choose such levels of loans and deposits
that the entrant would make non-positive profit and thus would not enter.
Let’s look at the incumbent’s problem in a slightly more formal way. The
profit from accommodation is computed in the same way as in the standard case







1 ))− r)LA1 + (r(1− α)− rD(DA1 + D∗2(DA1 )))DA1
− γLLA1 − γDDA1 , (3.10)
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where the index A stands for accommodation and LA1 and D
A
1 are the optimal
choices of the Stackelberg leader from above.
The profit from entry deterrence is computed in a slightly more complex way.
As the first step, the incumbent has to compute its own amounts of loans and
deposits which induce the entrant’s profit to be non-positive. Precisely, the in-
cumbent chooses such amounts of loans L1 and deposits D1 that the following
equation holds
π2 =((rL(L1 + L
∗
2(L1))− r)L∗2(L1) + (r(1− α)− rD(D1 + D∗2(D1)))D∗2(D1)
− γLL∗2(L1)− γDD∗2(D1)− F ) ≤ 0, (3.11)
Note that we have obtained this equation by plugging the entrant’s reaction
functions into the entrant’s profit function and by comparing the resulting term to
0. Thus, the entry-deterrence equation implicitly defines the combinations of the
incumbent’s loans and deposits for which the entrant’s profit is non-positive. Pre-











where the index ∗∗ means that the respective variable belongs to the solutions of
the implicit equation given above6. In the second step, the incumbent maximizes
its monopoly profit function (entry is deterred) subject to the entry-deterrence
equation given above. Thus, the problem is to maximize
π1 = (rL(L
∗∗
1 )− r)L∗∗1 + (r(1− α)− rD(D∗∗))D∗∗1 − γLL∗∗1 − γDD∗∗1 (3.12)











1 ) can be shown to be functions if demand and supply are linear.
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It is obvious that the optimal loans and deposits decisions are interdepen-
dent now - the interdependence naturally comes from the entry-deterrence con-
dition. The incumbent’s optimization problem is then completed by the com-







1 ), where the index
∗∗∗ means that the respective variable is
the solution of the incumbent’s profit maximization problem in the case of entry
deterrence. However, the main result of interest for us is the presence of the inter-
dependence between the deposits and loans decisions in the entry deterrence part
of the whole problem.
The loans and deposits decision problems might obviously become interde-
pendent even in the standard Monti-Klein model once we relax our assumptions
about the separability of the cost function. However, the administrative costs are
arguably not very important relative to other aspects of the banking business and
thus, the issue of the independence of the decision problems should not hinge only
on the form of the cost function7.
3.3 Barriers to mobility in the Monti-Klein model
with differentiated price competition
The present modification of the Monti-Klein model is very similar to the first
model discussed in this chapter. The main difference is that now the two banks
are assumed to be choosing prices (the interest on loans and deposits) instead of
quantities (the amounts of loans and deposits) - in the jargon of game theory, we
7For a discussion of the basic determinants of the commercial banking business see for example
Sinkey (2002).
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have different strategic variables here. If we had homogenous product in a model
with prices as strategic variables, we would get the standard undercutting problem
which is known as the Bertrand paradox. Thus, in order to avoid undercutting and
the implied absolute price competition, we assume here that the bank’s product
(loans and deposits) is not perfectly homogenous. In other words, we assume
that the loans and deposits are partially differentiated. For the sake of simplicity
of notation, we neglect the reserve requirements represented by the parameter α
(without loss of generality, we set it equal to zero arbitrarily). Otherwise, the
setup of the model is the same as in the case with quantity competition.
The logic of the solution of the model is very similar to the logic of the model
from the previous section and thus we proceed at a slightly faster pace this time.
The incumbent bank is again comparing its profit in the accommodation with the
entry deterrence cases. For both these cases, it first needs to know the entrant’s
reaction function which can be computed by maximizing the entrant’s profit with
respect to the entrant’s interest on loans rL2 and the entrant’s interest on deposits
rD2. The entrant’s profit function looks as follows
π2 = (rL2−r)L2(rL1, rL2)+(r−rD2)D2(rD1, rD2)−C(L2(rL1, rL2), D2(rD1, rD2))−F,
(3.13)








≥ 0 due to the assumption of
partial differentiation of the loans and deposits. The first order conditions imply
L2(rL1, rL2)+(rL2−r)∂L2(rL1, rL2)
∂rL2















We can immediately see that the cost function term is the first potential source
of the interdependence between the decisions about loans and deposits. However,
as in the previous model, we are interested in a more fundamental source of the
interdependence and thus, from now on, we neglect the cost term completely. It is
then obvious that the entrant’s reaction functions take the form r∗L2 = r
∗
L2(r, rL1)
and r∗D2 = r
∗
D2(r, rD1).
The incumbent’s optimization problem in the case of accommodation is to
maximize the following profit function
πA1 =(rL1 − r)L1(rL1, r∗L2(rL1)) + (r − rD1)D1(rD1, r∗D2(rD1))
− C(L1(rL1, r∗L2(rL1)), D1(rD1, r∗D2(rD1))), (3.16)
where r∗L2(rL1) and r
∗
D2(rD1) stand for the reaction functions from the entrant’s
problem. The first order conditions imply (neglecting the cost term)


























)−D1(rD1, r∗D2(rD1)) = 0
(3.18)
It is again clear that the incumbent’s optimal choices of loans and deposits are
still independent in the case of accommodation.
The profit from entry deterrence is computed in the following way. Firstly, the
incumbent has to compute its own interest on loans and deposits which induce the
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entrant’s profit to be non-positive. Thus, the incumbent chooses such levels of rL1
and rD1 that the following equation holds
π2 = (r
∗
L2(rL1)− r)L2(rL1, r∗L2(rL1)) + (r − r∗D2(rD1))D2(rD2, r∗D2(rD1))− F ≤ 0
(3.19)
This entry-deterrence condition implicitly defines the combinations of the incum-
bent’s interest on loans and deposits for which the entrant’s profit is non-positive.
These combinations can be expressed as r∗∗L1 = r
∗∗





where the index ∗∗ means that the respective variable belongs to the solutions of
the implicit equation given above. In the second step, the incumbent maximizes
its monopoly profit function (entry is deterred) subject to the entry-deterrence
equation given above. Thus, the problem is to maximize
π1 = (r
∗∗
L1 − r)L(r∗∗L1) + (r − r∗∗D1)D(r∗∗D1) (3.20)
subject to the entry deterrence condition r∗∗L1 = r
∗∗
L1(r, rL2).
It is obvious that the optimal decisions about the interests on loans and de-
posits are now interdependent - the interdependence again comes from the entry-
deterrence equation.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have focused on the issue of the separability of banks’ decisions
about loans and deposits in the family of industrial organization models derived
from the Monti-Klein model. In the standard oligopoly version of the Monti-
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Klein model, under appropriate assumptions about the banks’ cost functions, the
decisions about loans and deposits are independent. In this chapter, we were
able to show that this independence is rather an exception to the rule because it
depends on the very simple industry structure of the banking industry assumed in
the standard Monti-Klein model.
The previous efforts to break the independence of the loans and deposits deci-
sions in the Monti-Klein model have achieved their goal by considering relatively
strong modifications of the original setup. These models are interesting but, due
to their complexity, not very easy to work with in empirical work. In this chapter,
we have shown that it is enough to adopt more realistic assumptions about the
industry structure and the independence breaks down. Thus, we have shown that
it is possible to build a model which is able to explain the interdependence of the
two major bank’s decision problems and yet keeps relative simplicity.
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3.5 Appendix
Review of the standard Monti-Klein model
We review here the standard oligopoly version of the Monti-Klein model which
serves as a benchmark model for our analysis in this paper. More precisely, we
concentrate on the duopoly version due to Freixas and Rochet (1997) for the sake
of simplicity and clarity of exposition (the generalization to the n-banks case is
trivial).
The model assumes a downward sloping demand for loans L(rL), an upward
sloping supply of deposits D(rD) and the respective inverse functions rL(L) and
rD(D). The demand for loans and the supply of deposits are assumed to be
independent (otherwise the interdependence occurs trivially). Furthermore, there
is a perfectly elastic money market with exogenously given rate r. Bank i takes the
amount of loans and deposits chosen by the other banks as given and maximizes its
profit by the choice of the amount of loans Li it offers and the amount of deposits
Di it demands (i is 1 or 2 in duopoly). The profit function of bank i takes the
form
πi = (rL(L1 + L2)− r)Li + (r(1− α)− rD(D1 + D2))Di − C(Li, Di), (3.21)
where α reflects the exogenous reserve requirements and C(Li, Di) is the bank’s
cost function which is assumed to be the same for all banks and which is usually
interpreted as the administrative cost associated with the provision and manage-
ment of loans Li and deposits Di. After combining the first order conditions we
obtain the pricing rule L = 1
2ε
, where L stands for Lerner index and ε stands for
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demand elasticity. In our case, this rule takes the form













It is clear from these optimality conditions that the interdependence of the loans





It is commonly assumed that C(Li, Di) takes an additively separable form C(Li, Di) =
γLLi +γDDi. In such a case, we obtain full independence of the loans and deposits
decisions and the optimal amounts of loans and deposits are determined as
L∗i = L
∗
i (r, γL, L−i) (3.24)
D∗i = D
∗
i (r, α, γD, D−i), (3.25)
where the index −i stands for ”other than i”.
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Chapter 4
The determinants of retail bank
fees in Central Europe
Abstract
We analyze a unique dataset on fees from five Central European countries and
test an empirical model of the determinants of the retail bank fee levels in these
countries. We build the model on the predictions of the existing literature about
the most likely determinants of the fee levels. We find support for the Structure
Conduct Performance hypothesis about the effect of industry concentration, im-
portance of the differences in the degree of reliance on cashless payments and the
differences in labor intensity and technology level of the banks’ operations. Our
analysis thus shows that the international differences in retail bank fees can be
explained by fundamental economic factors and thus it is a contribution to the
continuing debate about retail bank fees.
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4.1 Introduction
The level of retail bank fees has always been an issue of great interest in the debates
among bankers, policymakers and even the general public worldwide. The interest
in the bank’s approaches to pricing of the basic retail bank services has been
especially evident in the Central European region where the debate culminated
to an open conflict between some of the main interested parties. Specifically, the
Czech Republic has even seen a number of cases of litigation against major banking
houses initiated by an influential domestic consumer defense organization.
The surge in the intensity of the public interest in the level of fees can arguably
be at least partially attributed to the recent international comparisons which have
shown that fees scaled by proxies for purchasing power parity tend to be higher in
the less developed countries. Specifically, in the previous chapters we have already
discussed the Capgemini, ING and EFMA (2005, 2006) studies which report a
negative relationship between the economic level of a country and the fee levels
scaled by GDP per capita. It is not surprising that such results could help to create
fears that the relatively high level of retail bank fees in the emerging economies is
due to inter-bank collusion and cartelization of the market.
In the first chapter we have shown that there exist a number of fundamental
theoretical reasons for the prevailing international differences in fees. The goal of
this chapter is to complement our theoretical work from the previous chapters by
providing an empirical analysis of the retail bank fee levels in Austria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia with the aim of identifying whether there
is empirical support for the fundamental economic reasons for the international
differences in the level of retail bank fees.
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The analysis is made possible thanks to the availability of a unique dataset on
the fee levels in the five Central European countries. It is generally almost impos-
sible to obtain quality data about retail bank fees in the detail and size necessary
for a rigorous empirical analysis (as Hannan (2006) reports, it is extremely difficult
to obtain such data even for the US). This unavailability of the data on fees also
causes the fact, that although a large number of empirical studies have focused on
the determinants of bank interest rates, there is only small evidence concerning
the determinants of the retail bank fees so far.
The uniqueness of the dataset is even more evident when we consider the socio-
geographical region it covers. Specifically, analyzing the fee level differences within
Central Europe has two important advantages for our research purposes. Firstly,
the region can be characterized by significant differences in the maturity of the
banking sector, as shown by Hanousek, Kocenda and Ondko (2007) who document
differences in privatization of the banking sector in the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries as well as ensuing significant changes in financial flows between the
banking sector and other sectors of the economy. Within the set of the countries
in our dataset, the differences are also evident from the comparison of Austria
as a traditionally strong banking country and the other four countries which are
still in the process of gradual development of their banking sectors (see also the
description of the data in the Appendix)1. Secondly, the countries in the Central
European region form a very compact group of countries with strong cultural and
historical links (most of the countries in our dataset even share common history as
parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy). Due to these links, there are important
1Importantly, Austria has also been a market economy for the whole post World War II
period, in contrast to the other countries in the sample.
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similarities in consumption habits and needs, views about the role of money and
ultimately also about the behavior of bank clients in relation to banks.
This developmental variation on one hand and the relative compactness on the
other hand make the region a natural laboratory from the point of view of our
research goals. The variation helps to identify the effects of the variables in our
model and the similarities make easier the comparison of the fee levels between
the different countries. Specifically, it is possible to use indexing of the prices of
bank services based on a specified behavior of a typical bank client (experts from
Scott & Rose, s.r.o., the provider of our data on fees, were able to set up a typical
client behavior model robust for the different countries in the dataset).
As we have already discussed in the first chapter (and as we elaborate on in
greater detail in the later sections), the existing literature implies that among the
most likely supply side factors affecting the apparent vast international differences
in bank fees are the banks’ costs, degree of competition in the market and regula-
tion of the banking industry. Among the demand side factors, it is expected that
there may be a cross-subsidization between the different types of bank products as
banks are trying to maximize the benefits from facing a pool of clients with given
demand characteristics.
Due to the specific characteristics of our dataset (specifically the developmental
variation in our data), we believe that a crucial role among the cost factors is
played by the degree of reliance on cashless payments in the country of a given
bank. Cash-related operations represent a significant cost burden for any bank
due to high labor requirements of cash-handling processes and the opportunity
costs of necessary cash reserves. As cashless payment technologies represent a
characteristic of a more advanced banking industry, we can expect the share of
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cashless payments to vary significantly across the countries in our dataset (this is
indeed confirmed in a more detailed data description in the Appendix). Similar
arguments can be given in support of the expected importance of the differences
in the labor intensity and general technological level of the banking industries in
the countries in our dataset.
Our analysis can also be understood as a contribution to the literature on test-
ing the contradicting empirical predictions of the Structure Conduct Performance
and the Efficient Structure hypotheses regarding the influence of concentration on
prices in the banking industry. As the connection between the degree of competi-
tion in the banking sector and the level of retail bank fees has been at the center of
the continuing debates about fees, discriminating among the two hypotheses also
has relevance for future policy approaches to the banking industry.
In this chapter, we primarily focus on testing an empirical model based on
the cost, competition, regulation and cross-subsidization factors, i.e. the factors
implied by the existing literature as the most likely determinants of the fee lev-
els. Our dataset does not allow us to directly test the implications of the effect
of asymmetric information and income inequality on the fee level (however, we
provide a partial test using an imperfect proxy for asymmetric information as part
of the sensitivity analysis).
The paper is organized around the following simple structure. In the next sec-
tion, we review the relevant literature on which we build the setup of our empirical
model. Further, we describe the model specification and the unique dataset we use
in our analysis. We proceed to the description and interpretation of the results
of our analysis, a sensitivity analysis for checking the robustness of the results
and finally we present the conclusions of our research. We provide further data
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description in the Appendix.
4.2 Literature review
As discussed above, the degree of competition is one of the common suspects
among the factors believed to be affecting bank fees. The literature on the rela-
tionship between industry concentration and pricing is very large. As reviewed
by Brewer and Jackson (2006) or Shaffer (2004), there are two main competing
theories - the traditional Market power theory, usually understood in the form of
the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis (SCP hypothesis) due to Mason
(1939) and Bain (1951, 1956), and the Efficient Structure hypothesis (ES hypoth-
esis) developed by Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977). Higher concentration
leads to higher prices under the SCP hypothesis (e.g. due to scale economies or
the X-inefficiencies discussed by Liebenstein (1966)) but may lead to lower prices
under the ES hypothesis (the more efficient firms are assumed to gain market share
in the dynamics of competition). Thus, the two main strands of literature in this
area lead to opposite implications2.
Within the context of the banking industry, the SCP and the ES hypotheses
were tested by a number of studies. Berger and Hannan (1989), Calem and Carlino
(1991), Hannan and Berger (1991) and Jackson (1992) focus on the deposit interest
rates and they generally find negative relationship between concentration and the
level of deposit interest rates, thus they support the SCP hypothesis (lower deposit
2It should however be noted that a distinctive strand of literature implies doubts about sys-
tematic link between concentration and competitive behavior. This is the contestability literature
based on Baumol (1982) and Baumol et al. (1982) which implies that even an industry with
only one firm but with low enough barriers to mobility can be characterized by prices close to
the perfect competition level.
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rates can be viewed as higher or less favorable ”prices” for bank clients).
The common specification in this type of papers is
rijt = α + βCONCjt + γ
NXijt + εijt, (4.1)
where CONC is a measure of concentration (typically the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index of industry concentration or the top-three firm concentration ratio) and X
is a vector of control variables. Specifically, Jackson (1992) uses market growth,
market share, T-bill rate, total assets and time as the control variables. Brewer
and Jackson (2006) are first to show that it is important to control also for bank
specific riskiness; otherwise there might be spurious regression as banks in more
concentrated markets might be less risky and thus charge lower rates (the exis-
tence of the positive link between individual bank riskiness and deposit rates is
shown by Brewer and Mondschean (1994) and the negative link between concen-
tration and riskiness by Rhoades and Rutz (1982)). Brewer and Jackson (2006)
thus include measures of capital adequacy (total capital to total assets) and asset
quality (non-performing loans to total assets and the gap between rate sensitive
assets and liabilities to total assets). They also use an equally weighted index of
three types of deposit rates instead of individual rates (they argue that banks may
use deposit rates strategically, thus an index is better than the individual rates)
and they find that the magnitude of the effects of concentration on deposit rates
decreases by about fifty percent after controlling for the individual bank riskiness.
Other authors have found evidence in favor of the ES hypothesis. For example,
Kahn, Pennacchi and Sopranzetti (2000) have found that although the data on
personal loans support the SCP hypothesis, data on automobile loans support the
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ES hypothesis - they have shown that higher concentration reduces the rates on
these loans.
There are also some theoretical papers implying the possibility of the negative
link between concentration and prices for different reasons than gains in efficiency.
Broecker (1990) shows that competition between banks in the provision of loans
under asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection in the banks’ credit-
worthiness testing processes (the more banks there are in the market the higher
is the probability that a given bad borrower is accepted by at least one bank)
and higher number of banks (lower concentration) then may force banks to charge
a higher loan rate. Marquez (2002) receives similar results in a model in which
banks’ knowledge about the market is worsening with the number of banks in the
market (under the assumption of limited capacity).
Another strand of literature important for our analysis focuses on the determi-
nation of net interest margins (defined as the difference between interest income
and interest expense as a percentage of assets) - many contributions within this
category imply that the banks’ decisions about interest rates and fees are intercon-
nected. Authors of these contributions thus include fee-relevant variables among
the explanatory variables in their models. Many explanatory variables from these
models can be expected to be associated with the bank’s pricing process in general
(thus influencing both margins and fees).
Two main approaches have been used to study the determination of interest
margins - the dealership approach (Ho and Saunders [1981], Allen [1988]) and the
industrial organization approach to the banking firm (building on the Monti-Klein
model, e.g. Zarruck [1989], Wong [1997], Goyeau et al. [1999]). The dealership
approach perceives margins to be a form of bank’s compensation for the risks asso-
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ciated with the maturity discrepancies between the loans it sells and the deposits
it buys. The industrial organization approach as presented by Wong (1997) per-
ceives the bank as a standard firm which maximizes expected profit. Compared to
the original Monti-Klein framework, the bank is risk-averse and faces credit and
interest rate risks.
Nys (2003) builds an empirical model which combines the variables implied
by the two approaches mentioned above and most importantly she also includes
bank fees revenue as an explanatory variable. She concludes that there is an
inverse relationship between the bank fee revenue and the interest margin - thus,
she finds evidence for a cross-subsidization between the interest and non-interest
bearing activities (fee-related services). Other explanatory variables in her model
include measures of interest rate risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, administrative
costs, opportunity costs and equity capital.
Gischer and Juttner (2003) use the dealership approach and also find a strong
inverse relationship between the fee income and the margins. The other explana-
tory variables include the country’s exposure to foreign competition, domestic
market power, cost factors and several risk measures.
Demirg-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) also study the determination of the
margins. They use measures of regulations, concentration, inflation and national
institutions as explanatory variables (together with several controls for risk factors)
and conclude that margins increase in tighter regulation of entry and in higher
inflation. Importantly, they also control for the fee income and they report an
inverse relationship between the fee income and the level of the margins - thus,
their results also support the hypothesis of the cross-subsidization between the
interest and non-interest bearing activities.
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Although the authors mentioned above find an inverse relationship between
margins and fee income, it does not automatically follow that there is an inverse
relationship between margins and fees. A bank’s fee income obviously equals the
level of fees multiplied by the amount of fee-related services purchased by the
bank’s clients and thus it might have happened that the banks with low interest
margins sold more fee-related services than the banks with high interest margins.
This is actually supported by Carb and Rodrguez (2007) who find that the spread
between loan and deposit rates is not significantly related to a measure of the
value of fee-based acivities (measured by the Boyd and Gertler (1994) estimator3).
Nevertheless, the significant relationship between the interest and non-interest
bearing activities suggests that the link between the fee levels and the margins
should be controlled for in our analysis.
In contrast to the large literature on deposit and loan interest rates, the liter-
ature on the determination of retail bank fees has been surprisingly small. To our
best knowledge, the only relevant empirical paper is Hannan (2006). Hannan uses
a unique cross-section of US banks and tests the systematic differences in pricing
between single-market and multi-market banks implied by the spatial models of
Barros (1999) and Park and Pennacchi (2005). He focuses on the determination of
six selected retail bank fees and for each of them runs the following cross-sectional
regression (one for each of the years in the sample)
feei =β0 + β1HHI + β2ln(BKASSETSi) + β3ln(MKTPOP ) + β4MMSHAREi+
β5MMSHAREi ∗HHI + β6BRSHAREi, (4.2)
3The estimator is defined as (fee income / total revenue - fee income) x total bank assets.
106
where HHI stands for the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, BKASSETS
for the total bank assets, MKTPOP for the size of the bank’s local market,
BRSHARE for the bank’s market share in terms of the number of branches and
finally MMSHARE stands for the market share of the bank’s multimarket com-
petitors, again defined in terms of the number of branches.
Concerning the relationship between concentration and fees, Hannan has found
a significant positive relationship supporting the SCP hypothesis. However, Han-
nan’s approach has several drawbacks from the viewpoint of the goals of our analy-
sis. Firstly, the study is focused entirely on the US market and thus it doesn’t allow
for the degree of heterogeneity implied by our data from Central European (mostly
emerging) countries. Secondly, Hannan’s analysis focuses on the determination of
individual types of fees instead of some representative type of fee index and thus
it doesn’t allow for the possible interaction and cross-subsidizations between the
different types of fees. Although this approach may work well for the relatively
homogenous environment of highly competitive US banking industry, it would be
much more questionable when applied to the international data we intend to use.
4.3 Model
Conceptually, we derive our model mainly from the setups of Hannan (2006) and
Brewer and Jackson (2006). In contrast to Hannan (2006), we use an index of fees
instead of individual fees as the dependent variable and we modify the setup so
as to control for greater heterogeneity in the data due to the international focus
of our analysis. Unlike Brewer and Jackson (2006), the composition of the index
is based on the actual behavior of a representative bank client instead of using
107
equal weights (the composition of the index is described in section Data and in the
Appendix). We scale the fee index by total deposits per capita in a given country
as that captures both the effect of the purchasing power parity adjustment and
also the indication of the general development of the country’s banking sector.
The use of a fee index has several important advantages when compared to
the use of individual fees. Most importantly, this approach is robust to the dif-
ferences in the banks’ strategies in pricing their portfolios of services. As already
discussed in the first chapter, only within the category of core day-to-day services
there exist at least four broad pricing approaches (the account based, packaged
based, transaction based and indirect revenue based pricing approaches4) which
differ in the way how banks are generating revenues from comparable portfolios
of services. Two banks may charge a completely different price for a given service
while the total price of a specified set of services may be exactly equal due to
cross-subsidization within the banks’ portfolios. Thus, a well specified index of
the total price of a typically consumed bundle of services can clearly convey better
information about the international differences in the costs of basic retail bank
services than any of the individual fees.
The general framework used to build our empirical model consists of four main
types of factors:
1. cost of providing fee-related services,
2. competition,
3. regulation and
4This classification is used by the Capgemini, EFMA and ING (2005) study discussed in the
first chapter.
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4. demand side (client-related) factors.
The cost of providing fee-related services influences the fee level even under
marginal cost pricing, i.e. under perfect competition. Competition and regula-
tion determine the deviation of fees from marginal costs even in a single product
environment and finally the client-related factors account for the deviation from
marginal cost pricing due to the fact that banks offer multiple products and the
basic services represent only a subset of these products.
To control for the cost factors, we follow Hannan (2006) and include bank size
measured by total bank assets. The bank size can be expected to be a good proxy
for many cost factors but only within a given country and a certain period of time.
As our dataset includes a heterogeneous mix of countries, we have to control for
labor costs and technology level which can vary significantly between countries
and over time. We do it by including the individual effect and a proxy for the
level of labor intensity of the banks’ operations measured by personnel expenses
normalized by the bank’s assets. Further, as suggested by Brewer and Jackson
(2006) we control for the bank’s riskiness by including the share of common equity
on total bank’s assets.
As we have already discussed in the introduction, we have to control for po-
tentially huge differences in the costs of providing payment services implied by
the different degree of reliance on cashless payments in the different countries. To
control for these differences we include a proxy for the degree of reliance on the
cashless payments measured by the number of payment cards issued in a country
per million inhabitants.
To measure the effect of competition on the level of fees we use the market share
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of the top five banks as an indicator of the industry concentration in the banking
industry. As part of the sensitivity analysis, we also control for the non-banking
competition (we use the measure of total assets managed by insurance companies,
investment funds and pension funds)5.
The regulation can obviously affect fees in many different ways. Different
countries have different regulatory measures some of which have a direct impact
on the basic bank services. It is difficult to hypothesize what will be the effect of the
different regulations but it is clearly important to control for this significant source
of external influence. It is natural to expect that tighter regulation would mean a
less competitive banking sector and thus higher pricing power of banks. However,
the regulation can target fees directly in which case the tighter regulation can lead
to lower fee levels. To control for the effect of regulation we include the Heritage
Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index of regulation for the given country.
Concerning the demand side (client-related) factors, i.e. the multi-product
nature of the pricing process, it is important to realize that a typical bank offers
at least two types of products - the basic and the intermediation (deposit and
credit) services captured for example by the spread between the deposit and loan
rates. These products are clearly connected. When a client wants to get credit
from a bank she first needs to have an account with the bank - i.e. she needs to
5As suggested by one of the referees, Evan Kraft, as an alternative we could use a more di-
rect measure of competition, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics (based on Rosse and Panzar (1977)
and Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987)) defined as the sum of the elasticities of the bank’s rev-
enues with respect to input prices (H ≤ 0 implies monopoly/cartel, 0 < H < 1 implies
oligopoly/monopolistic competition, H = 1 implies perfect competition). Unfortunately, the
data on the H-statistics are not easily available for the countries and the time period in our sam-
ple (furthermore, the methodology of H-statistics estimation differs among authors), a rigorous
analysis with the H-statistics is thus left for further research. As a preliminary step, we estimated
the model with the historical values of H-statistics from Bikker, Spierdijk and Finnie (2007) and
received a positive effect of H-statistics on the normalized fees. For a discussion of the recent
use of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics see for example Bikker, Spierdijk and Finnie (2007).
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buy the basic services too. In such a context, the basic services may be used as a
loss-leader (see e.g. Chevalier (2000)) and thus there might be cross-subsidization
effects influencing the level of fees for these services.
As the potential cross-subsidization between the main types of bank services
may significantly affect the level of fees (which can be understood as the price of
the basic services), we follow the existing literature suggesting the existence of the
link between net interest margins and fee income (e.g. Nys (2003), Gischer and
Juttner (2003) or Demirgu-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004)) and include the net
interest margin as a control for the connection to the intermediation services.
Based on the rationale above, the empirical model can be expressed by the
following equation (for bank i, the corresponding country j and time t):
Yijt =αi + β1ASSETSit + β2CASHLESSjt + β3EASSETSit + β4NIMit+
β5MSHAREjt + β6PERSONit + β7REGjt + εit, (4.3)
where Yijt stands for the bank fee index relative to the total bank deposits
(from non-financial institutions) in the bank’s country per capita (alternatively we
use the fee index relative to GDP per capita in the section Sensitivity analysis),
αi is the bank’s fixed effect, ASSETSit are bank’s total assets, CASHLESSjt
the share of non-cash payments on total payments measured by the number of
payment cards issued in the bank’s country, EASSETSit the bank’s share of
common equity to total assets, NIMit the net interest margin, MSHAREjt the
market share of the top five banks in the given country, PERSONit the bank’s
share of personnel expenses on total assets and REGjt the regulatory strength
measured by the Economic Freedom Index of regulation.
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4.4 Data
The data we use come from three main sources. The unique bank-specific data
on the fee levels have been provided by Scott and Rose, s.r.o., a market research
firm with long experience with analyzing the Central European banking industry.
The data on the other bank-specific variables come from the Bankscope database
and the data on the country-specific macroeconomic variables come from the ECB
statistics. The data cover five Central European countries (Austria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) over the period of years 2005, 2006 and
2007.
As we have already discussed in the section Model, the data on the fee levels are
in the convenient form of fee indices. The composition of the index created by Scott
and Rose, s.r.o. is based on the actual behavior of a representative client in Slovakia
(the choice is robust to the other countries due to the consumption similarities in
the region discussed above). Each of the main categories of services/activities is
assigned a weight calculated as the average frequency/intensity of its use on the
aggregate level, based on the collected data about the total purchases of the retail
bank services in the country. The list of services/activities included in the index
as well as the values of the respective weights can be found in Table 4.12 in the
Appendix.
The exact definitions and sources of the individual variables used in the analysis
are given in Table 4.8 in the Appendix and a more detailed statistical description
of the data can be found in the Appendix.
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4.5 Results
The detailed results of the regressions are reported in Table 4.1. Here we comment
on the main results and their implications.
All the coefficients in the model have the expected signs with CASHLESS, EAS-
SETS, MSHARE and PERSON being significant. The negative sign of CASHLESS
confirms the expected negative relationship between the degree of reliance on the
cashless (lower cost) payment services and the fee level. The positive significant
coefficient of MSHARE supports the SCP hypothesis of the positive relationship
between concentration and prices. The positive significant coefficient of EASSETS
proves the importance of controlling for the bank’s riskiness suggested by Brewer
and Jackson (2006)6 and finally the positive significant value of the coefficient of
PERSON confirms the importance of controlling for the international differences
in the labor intensity and technological level of the banks’ operations.
The insignificance of ASSETS should not be surprising given the fact that
much of the role of ASSETS as a proxy for cost factors is in the fixed effect model
captured by the fixed effects. ASSETS would arguably become significant under
a more dynamic growth of assets of banks in the dataset. Although our dataset
includes countries with maturing banking sectors, we did not observe this dynamic
growth due to the limited available time dimension of the dataset.
6Our positive sign is in line with the negative one received by Jackson and Brewer (2006) as
they are studying the impact on deposit interest rates instead of fees.
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(Total bank assets) (0.33) 
CASHLESS -1.005 *** 
(No. of payment cards per mil. inhabitants) (-3.04) 
EASSETS 0.047 ** 
(Common equity to total assets) (2.16) 
NIM -6.828 
(Net interest margin) (-0.91) 
MSHARE 0.039 ** 
(Top 5 banks market share) (2.18) 
PERSON 46.076 ** 
(Personnel expenses per total assets) (2.45) 
REG 0.004 
(Economic Freedom Index) (1.04) 
Intercept -0.141 
 (-0.12) 
Estimation procedure Bank specific 
fixed effects  
 




Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  The symbols *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
4.6 Sensitivity analysis
In order to check the robustness of our results, we estimate variants of the model
with alternative measures of the main explained or explanatory variables and also
with alternative exclusions of potential outliers. The estimation procedure remains
the fixed effects model as the Hausman test rejects the random effect model on
1% significance level in all cases.
We first run the same regression as above but with an alternative dependent
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variable in the form of the fee index scaled by the GDP per capita. The results of
the regression are reported in Column 2 in Table 4.2 (Column 1 reports the original
results for comparison). CASHLESS ceases to be significant but this can arguably
be caused by relatively strong relationship between CASHLESS and PERSON
variables which are both related to the economic development of the country.
The fit of the regression measured by the within R squared also decreases. The
coefficients of the significant variables remain on a very similar level.
Table 4.2: Regression results (all observations, alternative dependent variable)
 








Log of fee to 
GDP per capita 
ASSETS 9.39e-07 1.37e-06 
(Total bank assets) (0.33) (0.46) 
CASHLESS -1.005 *** -0.528 
(No. of payment cards per mil. inhabitants) (-3.04) (-1.52) 
EASSETS 0.047 ** 0.052 ** 
(Common equity to total assets) (2.16) (2.26) 
NIM -6.828 -10.015 
(Net interest margin) (-0.91) (-1.27) 
MSHARE 0.039 ** 0.050 *** 
(Top 5 banks market share) (2.18) (2.63) 
PERSON 46.076 ** 48.933 ** 
(Personnel expenses per total assets) (2.45) (2.48) 
REG 0.004 0.005 
(Economic Freedom Index) (1.04) (1.28) 
Intercept -0.141 -1.690 
 (-0.12) (-1.35) 




R2 (within, not counting the influence of 
fixed effects) 
0.35 0.27 
N 122 122 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  The symbols *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Next, we exclude ASSETS from the regression as it is not significant and much
of its role in a fixed effect model is arguably captured by the fixed effects (see
the discussion in section Results). The results, reported in Column 2 in Table 4.3,
show that the exclusion of ASSETS does not have an important effect on the value
of the coefficients, the significance of the variables or the regression fit (Column 1
reports the regression with ASSETS for comparison).
Table 4.3: Regression results (all observations, ASSETS excluded)








Log of fee to 
total deposits 
per capita 
ASSETS 9.39e-07 Not included 
(Total bank assets) (0.33)  
CASHLESS -1.005 *** -0.985 *** 
(No. of payment cards per mil. inhabitants) (-3.04) (-3.05) 
EASSETS 0.047 ** 0.047 ** 
(Common equity to total assets) (2.16) (2.20) 
NIM -6.828 -6.958 
(Net interest margin) (-0.91) (-0.94) 
MSHARE 0.039 ** 0.039 ** 
(Top 5 banks market share) (2.18) (2.20) 
PERSON 46.076 ** 44.744 ** 
(Personnel expenses per total assets) (2.45) (2.46) 
REG 0.004 0.004 
(Economic Freedom Index) (1.04) (1.05) 
Intercept -0.141 -0.121 
 (-0.12) (-0.10) 




R2 (within, not counting the influence of 
fixed effects) 
0.35 0.35 
N 122 122 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  The symbols *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
116
We further report the results of the same regression as in the previous case (i.e.
without ASSETS) but after exclusion of e-Banka which uses a specific distribu-
tion channel in that it relies almost exclusively on internet banking. The results,
reported in Column 2 in Table 4.4, show that the exclusion of e-Banka has only
a marginal effect on the regression results (Column 1 shows the regression with
e-Banka for comparison)7.
Table 4.4: Regression results (e-Banka excluded, ASSETS excluded)








Log of fee to 
total deposits 
per capita 
CASHLESS -0.985 *** -0.986 *** 
(No. of payment cards per mil. inhabitants) (-3.05) (-3.00) 
EASSETS 0.047 ** 0.047 ** 
(Common equity to total assets) (2.20) (2.18) 
NIM -6.958 -6.973 
(Net interest margin) (-0.94) (-0.91) 
MSHARE 0.039 ** 0.039 ** 
(Top 5 banks market share) (2.20) (2.16) 
PERSON 44.744 ** 44.796 ** 
(Personnel expenses per total assets) (2.46) (2.34) 
REG 0.004 0.004 
(Economic Freedom Index) (1.05) (1.04) 
Intercept -0.121 -0.097 
 (-0.10) (-0.08) 




R2 (within, not counting the influence of 
fixed effects) 
0.35 0.35 
N 122 120 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  The symbols *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
7As suggested by Evan Kraft, we also estimated the model with the Transparency Inter-
national Corruption Perceptions Index instead of the Economic Freedom Index. However, the
estimated coefficient of this variable was also not significant (furthermore, the coefficient of
CASHLESS also ceased to be significant which was arguably caused by high correlation between
the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and CASHLESS).
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Austria is arguably the source of great portion of the variation in our data.
Thus, it is interesting to assess how much the results change if we exclude the ob-
servations for the Austrian banks in the dataset. The results, reported in Column
2 in Table 4.5, show that the exclusion of the Austrian banks leaves the values of
the parameters on a similar level but decreases the significance of CASHLESS and
EASSETS (Column 1 shows the regression with all observations for comparison).
The lower significance of CASHLESS is intuitive given the large difference in the
value of CASHLESS between Austria and the other countries in the dataset. Our
results thus seem to be robust even to the exclusion of the Austrian banks.
Table 4.5: Regression results (Austrian banks excluded, ASSETS excluded)
 








Log of fee to 
total deposits 
per capita 
CASHLESS -0.985 *** -0.872 ** 
(No. of payment cards per mil. inhabitants) (-3.05) (-2.57) 
EASSETS 0.047 ** 0.043 * 
(Common equity to total assets) (2.20) (1.85) 
NIM -6.958 -5.218 
(Net interest margin) (-0.94) (-0.68) 
MSHARE 0.039 ** 0.045 ** 
(Top 5 banks market share) (2.20) (2.38) 
PERSON 44.744 ** 54.482 ** 
(Personnel expenses per total assets) (2.46) (2.61) 
REG 0.004 0.003 
(Economic Freedom Index) (1.05) (0.74) 
Intercept -0.121 -0.530 
 (-0.10) (-0.41) 




R2 (within, not counting the influence of 
fixed effects) 
0.35 0.38 
N 122 107 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  The symbols *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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In the next step, we include loan loss provisions scaled by net profit as an
additional variable in the model. This variable could be understood as an im-
perfect proxy for the degree of asymmetric information the given bank is facing.
The intuition is the following. Based on the results of our theoretical work, we
hypothesize that the level of fees may be positively related to the degree of asym-
metric information in the given country. To measure the effect of asymmetric
information on the level of fees and thus to test our theoretical model we include
the share of loan loss provisions on the bank’s profit before provisions and taxes
as a proxy for the quality of loans. Under higher level of noise (borrowers’ mis-
perception of their abilities - see the first chapter) or lower testing quality, banks
face a relatively worse pool of borrowers and thus use higher fees to compensate
for the implied lower expected borrowers’ repayments. Internationally harmonized
regulatory systems require banks to create loan loss provisions in a volume reflect-
ing the expected repayments of loans and thus we should observe higher loan loss
provisions in countries with higher noise or lower testing quality. In order for the
predictions of the theoretical model to be confirmed, the effect of this variable
should be significant and positive which happens to be true.
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Table 4.6: Regression results (all obs., ASSETS excluded, LLPR included)
 








Log of fee to 
total deposits 
per capita 
CASHLESS -0.985 *** -0.852 ** 
(No. of payment cards per mil. inhabitants) (-3.05) (-2.60) 
EASSETS 0.047 ** 0.046 * 
(Common equity to total assets) (2.20) (1.78) 
NIM -6.958 -9.067 
(Net interest margin) (-0.94) (-1.22) 
MSHARE 0.039 ** 0.031 
(Top 5 banks market share) (2.20) (1.64) 
PERSON 44.744 ** 52.003 *** 
(Personnel expenses per total assets) (2.46) (2.78) 
REG 0.004 0.002 
(Economic Freedom Index) (1.05) (0.61) 
LLPR Not included 0.001 * 
(Loan loss provisions to profit)  (1.92) 
Intercept -0.121 0.325 
 (-0.10) (0.27) 
Estimation procedure     Bank specific 
fixed effects 
    Bank specific 
fixed effects 
R2 (within, not counting the influence of 
fixed effects) 
0.35 0.35 
N 122 113 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  The symbols *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Above we always used MSHARE as a measure of the degree of competition in
the given banking market. Column 2 of Table 4.7 shows the results after exchang-
ing MSHARE for HHI (i.e. the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as in Hannan (2006))
and Column 3 shows the results with MSHARE and after including also total as-
sets managed by insurance companies, investment funds and pension funds scaled
by total bank assets in the country (OTHCOMP) as a proxy for non-banking
competition. Although the inclusion of OTHCOMP makes both OTHCOMP and
MSHARE insignificant, the two variables are jointly significant.
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Table 4.7: Regression results (all observations, ASSETS excluded, alternative mea-
sures of competition)
 












Log of fee to 
total deposits 
per capita 
CASHLESS -0.985 *** -1.092 *** -1.010 ** 
(No. of payment cards per mil. 
inhabitants) 
(-3.05) (-3.23) (-2.52) 
EASSETS 0.047 ** 0.046 ** 0.053 ** 
(Common equity to total 
assets) 
(2.20) (2.08) (2.21) 
NIM -6.958 -9.958 -8.632 
(Net interest margin) (-0.94) (-1.34) (-1.05) 
MSHARE 0.039 ** Not included 0.043 
(Top 5 banks market share) (2.20)  (1.63) 
PERSON 44.744 ** 44.218 ** 51.673 ** 
(Personnel expenses per total 
assets) 
(2.46) (2.36) (2.61) 
REG 0.004 0.004 -0.055 
(Economic Freedom Index) (1.05) (2.36) (-0.17) 
HHI Not included 0.001 Not included 
(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index)  (1.30)  
OTHCOMP Not included Not included 0.087 
(Assets managed by non-
banking institutions scaled by 
total bank assets) 
  (0.18) 
Intercept -0.121 1.640 ** 2.494 
 (-0.10) (2.47) (0.16) 






R2 (within, not counting the 
influence of fixed effects) 
0.35 0.32 0.38 
N 122 122 113 
Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  The symbols *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter uses a unique dataset to analyze the determinants of retail bank
fees in the Central European region. A representative client approach is used to
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overcome the problems inherent to the previous analyses of individual fees, namely
the potential bias caused by neglecting the possible links between the different fee-
related products in the banks’ portfolios.
The results of the analysis support the predictions of the Structure Conduct
Performance hypothesis, i.e. the positive relationship between industry concentra-
tion and prices. The results also confirm our hypothesis that the degree of reliance
on cashless payments and the differences in the labor intensity and technological
level of the banks’ operations are significant cost factors determining the fee level
in a given country. Our results are robust to alternative measures of the fee level
and the main explanatory factors and also to the exclusion of Austria from the
sample (although the significance of some of the factors decreases).
Based on the results of our analysis, it can be expected that the levels of fees will
converge in the future in line with the convergence of the economic fundamentals
of the emerging countries towards those of the developed ones. Specifically, we can
expect this to happen due to the convergence in the degree of competition through
the continuing elimination of barriers to international competition between banks
(for example, some of the countries in our dataset are expected to enter the Euro-
zone soon), in the degree of reliance on cashless payments (with the increasing
buying power of consumers) and the labor intensity and technological level of the
banks’ operations (with the continuing proliferation of more advanced technologies
and converging cost of labor).
The crucial message of our results is that the apparent international differences
in the levels of fees can be explained by fundamental economic factors. Our results
thus oppose simplified explanations of the fee differences based on pure carteliza-
tion of the banking market. Thus, the analysis in this chapter is also a contribution
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to the continuing public debate about the implications of the prevailing fee levels
for competition policy and approach of regulatory institutions to banks.
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This part of the Appendix presents selected characteristics of the dataset used in
the analysis. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the vast difference between the fee levels in
Austria and the other countries in the sample.
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This phenomenon is visible in the case of both alternative measures of the fee
level in a country, the log of fee to total deposits in the country per capita and the
log of fee to GDP per capita.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the international differences in the degree of reliance on
cashless payments, in this case measured by the number of payment cards issued in
a country per million of inhabitants. We can see that Austria is the clear leader in
the use of cashless payments among the countries in the dataset, whereas Poland
visibly lags behind.
The difference in cashless payments between Austria and the other countries is
even more profound when measured by the transaction value achieved by all pay-
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ment cards (except e-money) per million inhabitants. According to this measure
depicted by Figure 4.4, Slovakia is getting ahead of the other maturing countries
in 2006.
The third measure of cashless payments depicted by Figure 4.5, the percentage
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of people older than 16 who used internet banking within the last three months,
shows a similar picture, but with Slovakia ahead of the other maturing countries.
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Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate the degree of oligopoly power in the different
countries in our dataset. Both the market share of the top five banks in the
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country and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index show a very similar picture. Austria
emerges as the least concentrated, most competitive market, whereas the Czech
Republic and Slovakia occupy the other extreme.
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We have discussed above that we expect the cross-sectional heterogeneity to
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show up also in the degree of labor intensity and technological level of the bank’s
operations. Figure 4.8 illustrates this phenomenon on the comparison of interna-
tional differences in the share of personnel expenses on total bank’s assets. The
lowest share is attained by Austria, whereas the highest by Poland.
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Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the alternative measures of fee level and the measures
of the degree of reliance on cashless payments. The simple regression suggests a
negative relationship between the two variables.
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 compare the data on the fee level with the personnel
expenses normalized by assets of the given bank. The simple regressions suggest a
positive relationship between these variables. It should also be noted that the two
extreme values of the personnel expenses to assets belong to e-Banka, the Czech
bank with a special distribution channel strategy which relies almost exclusively
on internet banking.
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 compare the data on common equity to total assets with
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the two alternative measures of the fee level.
Finally, Figure 4.15 illustrates the relative size of assets held by banks in the
different countries in our dataset. It clearly shows the dominant size of the Austrian
banks relative to their counterparts from the other countries in the dataset.
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Table 4.8: Definition and source of the variables used in the analysis 
Variable Definition Source 
ijtY  Fee index of bank i in country j at time t / total bank deposits per capita in country j at time t 
Scott & Rose, s.r.o. (fee index), 




Fee index of bank i in country j at time t / 
GDP per capita in country j at time t 
Scott & Rose, s.r.o. (fee index), 
ECB statistics (GDP) 
jtCASHLESS  Number of payment cards issued in a country j at time t per million inhabitants 
ECB Statistics 
itASSETS  Total assets of bank i at time t Bankscope database 
itEASSETS  Common equity as a share of total assets of bank i at time t 
Bankscope database 
itNIM  Net interest margin of bank i at time t = (interest income – interest expense)/total 
assets 
Bankscope database 
jtREG  Economic Freedom Index of Regulation The Heritage Foundation 
jtMSHARE  Market share of the top five banks in country j at time t 
EU Banking Structures 2007, 
ECB 
jtHHI  Herfindahl-Hirschman index of industry concentration (the sum of the squared market 
shares of the individual banks in country j) 
EU Banking Structures 2007, 
ECB 
jtOTHCOMP  Assets managed by insurance companies, investment funds and pension funds as a share 
of total assets of credit institutions in country j 
at time t 
EU Banking Structures 2007, 
ECB 
itPERSON  Personnel expenses of bank i as a share of its assets 
Bankscope database 









Poland Slovakia Hungary 
Number of banks in the dataset 
2004 5 10 10 11 6 
2005 5 10 10 11 7 
2006 5 9 10 10 7 
Total assets of banks in the dataset (mil. EUR) 
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Table 4.12: Behavior of the representative client (Source: Scott&Rose,s.r.o.) 
Average account balance in SKK 23,000 
Account statements  
Monthly 64% 
Quarterly 36% 
Distribution of the statements  
- sent by post 76% 
- at a branch 24% 
Cash  
Number of cash deposits per month (4 000,- SKK on average)  0.35 
Number of cash withdrawals at a branch per month (4 000,-SKK on average)  0.59 
Number of cash withdrawals at an ATM of the client’s bank per month 
(1500,- SKK on average) 
1.97 
Number of cash withdrawals at an ATM of another bank per month 0.55 
Payments (within the country)  
Number of incoming payments per month 1.93 
Number of outgoing payments per month (not including permanent orders)  
(1 000 SKK on average) 
2.33 
Number of outgoing payments per month by a permanent order 2.11 
Share of inter-bank outgoing payments 81% 
Share of intra-bank outgoing payments 19% 
Frequency per year  
Initiation of a permanent payment order 1.77 
Change of a permanent payment order 1.83 
Cancellation of a permanent payment order 0.76 
Communication with the bank  
At a branch 62% 
Direct banking (internet, telephone, GSM)  38% 
Payment cards (percent of clients)  
Electron 85% 
Embossed 15% 
 
142
